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This Article presents an empirical, doctrinal, and theoretical critique of public engagement 
in the modern administrative state.  The legitimacy of the administrative state depends on 
the claim that it provides opportunities for public engagement as well as a mechanism for 
expert scientific decisionmaking.  A typical rulemaking proceeding lets experts make 
technical judgments about terrorism, transportation, or telecommunications subject to 
court review guarding against arbitrariness.  The whole process is then enmeshed in a 
system that is supposed to provide engagement – and therefore democratic accountability --
through presidential appointments and control, congressional oversight, and the public 
notice-and-comment process.  This existing approach is legitimated by “administrative 
pluralism,” a way of thinking that emphasizes the value of interest-group competition in 
shaping regulatory policy.  While administrative pluralism helps legitimate regulatory 
policy in the eyes of jurists, scholars, and the public, it also suppresses implicit questions 
about how much expert judgment is required in regulatory decisions, and whether the 
extent of participatory democracy and responsiveness is sufficient.  The problems are not 
abstract.  They are easily demonstrated in the course of a specific regulatory rulemaking 
proceeding, involving Section 314 of the USA Patriot Act (governing law enforcement’s 
access to financial information).  The task of balancing privacy concerns and law 
enforcement objectives hardly seems like the exclusive province of experts.  Individuals and 
interest groups did have a chance to submit comments in the rulemaking proceeding, but 
virtually all the comments taken seriously by the regulatory agency were sophisticated 
statements made by financial institutions and their lawyers.  While over 70% of comments 
came from individuals concerned about privacy, the agency did not even address these in 
its final rule.  Despite the administrative pluralism model’s tenacious hold, at least two 
alternatives exist to involve the public in rulemaking proceedings such as those governing 
Section 314, both of which involve constituting a small group of people whose discussions
can inform the regulatory process.  Participants can be either selected by lot from the entire 
population (a “majoritarian deliberation” approach), or chosen by the agency from among 
constituencies (such as outside experts) who may be especially impacted by the regulation 
but are essentially unrepresented (a “corrective” approach).  These approaches can 
generate valuable information about what informed citizens think of regulatory proposals. 
The technical challenge of implementing the alternatives is far from insurmountable, 
though difficult questions arise about selecting deliberation groups, framing the issue, and 
giving legal effect to the public’s participation.  Instead, two larger challenges remain.  
First is the challenge of choosing among different concepts of “administrative democracy” 
to combine expertise and participation.  Second is the challenge of overcoming a political 
economy that strongly favors the status quo.
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Broad delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modern 
administrative state; agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they 
once were, the exception; and as the sheer number of modern departments and 
agencies suggests, we are awash in agency “expertise.”1
--Antonin Scalia
Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law
[T]he express role of the public in democratic politics is not to act 
narrowly as a jury, as finders of fact.  They are instead empowered to serve as 
judges, as arbiters of what ought to be done.2
--Paul Sniderman
Taking Sides:  A Fixed Choice Theory of 
Political Reasoning
[A] well-functioning democracy seeks above all to produce policies that 
will, in fact, improve people’s lives… The task for the future is to develop 
institutions that will respond to people’s values, not to their errors.3
--Cass Sunstein
Risk and Reason
INTRODUCTION
Suppose after a terrorist attack federal officials want more access to the 
public’s private financial information. Prosecutors, investigators, and their 
superiors contend such access could help reduce the risk of terrorist attacks and 
fight serious crimes.  The legislature passes a statute to that effect, but does not 
work out the details.  The question then arises how those details will be worked 
out, and how the public will take part in developing a regulation that will 
potentially affect just about everyone in the country.
1
 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 516-17.
2 Paul Sniderman, Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF 
REASON 79 (Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, & Samuel Popkin, eds. 2000).
3 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 295 (2002).
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To be more specific, consider the implications of Section 314 of the 
USA Patriot Act.  This obscure little post-September 11 provision calls for 
regulations encouraging “further cooperation among financial institutions, their 
regulatory authorities, and law enforcement authorities.”4  Because of the 
statute’s ambiguity, the agency wielded a lot of discretion when it wrote the 
regulations.  It could engineer anything ranging from a pipeline for law 
enforcement access to private financial information, to mild requirement for 
financial institutions to have informal meetings with law enforcement every 
year.5
According to the prevailing approach to public engagement in the 
administrative state, the rulemaking process governing the Section 314 
regulations should reflect a distinctive blend of ingredients: expert 
decisionmaking by the Treasury Department, democratic accountability through 
representative democracy and public comments taken seriously by the agency, 
and judicial review against arbitrariness.6 One might surmise that banks would 
have something to say about these rules.  But only under the narrowest definition 
of “interest” could anyone say that only banks possess an interest in those rules.  
Individuals ranging from bank employees to farmworkers can have some sort of 
disaggregated interest in the efficacy of national security and law enforcement 
policies.  Immigrants who make international money transfers, investment 
bankers, and many other people in between might have some concern about how 
their financial records would give away their secrets.  The public at large might 
care how the Section 314 regulations fit into a larger web of laws affecting 
privacy.  
All of which makes what actually happened with Section 314 somewhat 
striking: the agency took a little-noticed, vague statute and turned it into an
efficient new mechanism for channeling private financial information to federal 
law enforcement while prohibiting notification of the subjects of the request.7
While over 70% of the public comments received came from laypeople 
4 See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56  (USAPA).  Section 314 of the Act is an 
uncodified provision that appears in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 31 U.S.C. 5311.  
Section 5311 is part of the BSA, and regulations implementing it appear at 31 CFR part 103.  
Since the authority of the Treasury Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the 
Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), then FinCEN has 
responsibility for developing the regulations under Section 314.  The statute admittedly provides 
a bit – though not much – more detail than what I have quoted above in establishing goals for the 
regulations.  For the full statutory text and additional details on the regulatory scheme, see infra 
Part II.a.
5
 The regulations the agency actually crafted, discussed in Part II, are reported in Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 60579, 60580-82 (September 26, 2002) 
(discussing comments received and making no mention of privacy concerns raised by 
commenters) (hereinafter, “Section 314 Final Rule Statement”).
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part II.a.
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concerned about their privacy, the agency appeared to ignore these 
unsophisticated comments, failing even to mention privacy as a concern in its 
discussion of the final rule.  Instead Treasury made various administrative 
changes in its proposed rules in response to the roughly 30% of comments from 
businesses and their representatives.8  Public interest organizations that normally 
care about privacy did not appear to participate in the rulemaking proceeding, 
perhaps in part because they had their hands full with other activities at a time of 
massive legal changes.9
Of course it’s possible to take this as little more than a parable about the 
futility of mass public involvement in the regulatory process.  No regulatory 
“public defender” stands ready to help laypeople plead their case to the agency.  
Clearly the political economy of regulation favors strong organized interests, not 
unsophisticated laypeople concerned about financial privacy.10 An agency facing 
time and resource constraint can hardly be expected to digest a jumble of 
unsophisticated comments from the public.  If there is any real source of 
democratic legitimacy in the administrative state (in this view), it is found in
oversight from representative politicians who can reverse the agency anytime.
There is, however, a different way to think about the Section 314 story, 
one that begins with two insights: that public engagement is supposed to make 
the administrative state more legitimate, and that in practical terms, engagement 
can mean something other than just waiting for interested parties to participate.  
Regardless of the substantive merits of the new regulations, Section 314 seems 
to raise the kind of balancing issue that calls for some sort of democratic 
participation.  Indeed, upon reflection it’s not altogether obvious that the 
political logic of the administrative state would preclude some alternative means 
of public consultation about how to balance security and privacy.11  If some kind 
of public participation in the regulatory process is supposed to engender
legitimacy, what then do we make of the experience with Section 314?  Indeed, 
what is public engagement supposed to accomplish, and what should it be 
expected to actually achieve given practical and political constraints?  
This article tries to make sense of these questions.  My method is to 
conduct an empirical case study of public participation in an unfamiliar 
regulatory context – involving criminal justice and the war on terrorism – and 
then to illustrate how the insights obtained are also relevant to more familiar 
8 See infra Part II.b.
9 See id.
10 See infra Part I.b.
11 See infra Part V.  See also JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE:  PRIVATE INTERESTS IN 
NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 11 (1993)(“The interest group literature, on the whole, is remarkably 
unclear about the nature of the roles of government actors in the policy-making process – that is 
about the nature of the relationships between private groups and public officials.  Much of the 
literature virtually ignores the officials and appears to assume that, like billiard balls, they will go 
wherever the interest groups send them.”).  
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regulatory domains.12  Surprisingly few academic studies assess public 
participation in regulatory policy,13 and the prescriptive literature on reforming 
the process also appears relatively thin.14 This is ironic since commentators and 
lawyers alike often assume that public participation – when coupled with judicial 
review and legislative oversight – is part what makes the administrative state 
legitimate.15 What often remains unclear is what kind of participation should be 
expected, or even what should be sought in order to make the administrative 
state legitimate.   Some critics might deride the link between legitimacy and 
public participation, and the notice-and-comment process in particular, as a 
charade that simply lets powerful interest groups engage in rent-seeking.16 But 
that view does not obviously follow from a belief that incentives shape political 
activity,17 nor does it explain the complicated institutional details of the 
12
 While most of my attention here is on federal regulation, my argument is also relevant to local, 
state, and transnational regulation.  Obviously regulatory systems are somewhat different across 
legal systems and levels of government.  But they all have to grapple with questions about the 
legitimacy of the regulating authority, the extent of desirable and feasible participatory 
democracy, and the centrality of expert decisionmaking.
13
 For two notable exceptions, see Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political 
Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 663 (1998)(finding that Medicare 
regulations developed pursuant to the regulatory notice-and-comment process appeared to have 
been impacted by comments from physicians expecting reductions in payments under the new 
rules); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING 157-203 (2ND ed. 1999)(discussing the extent of 
public participation in regulatory rulemaking proceedings, and concluding that such participation 
primarily reflects a process where “interest groups are the major forces”). 
14
 The prescriptive literature on participation in policymaking (and, by extension, in regulation) 
tends to fall into two categories: (1) philosophical discussions of the value of participation in 
policymaking in general (without strong attention to the intricacies of regulatory policy, or 
institutional detail); or (2) discussions of specialized issues like regulatory negotiation or the use 
of technology to facilitate participation.  For some interesting examples of the former, see Joshua 
Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 27-29 (1986); JAMES S. FISHKIN, 
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995).  For examples of the 
latter, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); 
Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in Rulemaking, KSG WORKING   PAPER 
SERIES NO. RWP03-022 (2003), avail. at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=421161.
15 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 191 (1947) (noting that the “principal purpose” of the notice and comment provisions in the 
APA was to “provide that the legislative functions of the administrative agencies shall as far as 
possible be exercised only upon participation on notice…”).  See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon 
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (public participation in rulemaking proceeding is meant to ensure 
that the regulation is response to the interests and needs of those regulated); Texaco, Inc. v. 
Federal Power Commission, 412 F.3d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (participation by parties with an 
interest in the regulatory rulemaking proceeding ensures that agencies’ decisions are based upon 
relevant information).
16 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233-48 
(1962).  See also Jonathan Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 280 (2002).
17 See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. LAW, 
ECON & ORG. 180 (1999) (where the focus is not on creating a “charade” but on obtaining 
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administrative process.18  Still other observers might defend the existing 
approach to public engagement – which seems to be premised on the idea that 
most of what an agency does is just to apply expert judgment to a problem 
defined by the legislature and overseen by the political branches.19
Admittedly, people’s views about the appropriate degree and kind of 
public engagement in the administrative state should be driven a lot by their 
overall conceptions of democracy, and particularly their conceptions about what 
makes the administrative state itself legitimate in a democracy.  Section 314 may 
have been enacted by the legislature, but the legislators entrusted the regulators
with the harder task of figuring out exactly what balance to strike between 
security and financial privacy.  This illustrates how the administrative state often 
combines a lot of power with broad legislative delegation.  The legitimacy of 
any legal or political institution might always be questioned, but the 
administrative state’s power and the indirect nature in which it exercises power 
might be seen to exacerbate uncertainties about its legitimacy.20
In response to such doubts, defenders of the administrative state often
point to certain institutional features that help legitimize things like the Section 
314 regulations, or in fact the entire administrative state.21  While the details 
depend on who you ask and for what purpose (i.e., theoretical exploration versus 
formal legal argument), the legitimacy-enhancing features are often taken to 
include the opportunity for the public to get involved in regulatory 
information about the strength and preferences of interest groups competing over policy 
outcomes).
18 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (noting that existing positive theories, by themselves, do not fully 
explain the institutional details of the regulatory process).
19
 Courts constantly emphasize the importance of deferring to expert agencies.  See, e.g., Pattern 
Makers’ Leage of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115 (1985) (upholding 
agency decision regarding an unfair labor practice because the “Board has the primary 
responsibility for applying ‘the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial 
life’”); National Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of 
a complaint against a Justice Department practice of creating a temporary audit log of gun 
purchasers, on the ground that “it is the agencies, not the courts, that have the technical 
expertise… to carry out statutory mandates”).
20 See infra Part III.a.  But see Posner and Vermeule, supra note___, at ___.
21
 A lot has been written defending the legitimacy of the administrative state on the basis of its 
institutional features.  The literature tends to emphasize the impact of political constraints on 
agency decisionmaking.  For some examples, see, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, 
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (2002)(“Congress is 
accountable when it delegates power – it is accountable for its decision to delegate power to the 
agency.  If the agency performs its function poorly, citizens will hold Congress responsible for 
the poor design of the agency, or for giving it too much power or not enough…”); Martin 
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 491 (1986)(defending rulemaking 
from a perceived “wholesale synoptic attack on rulemaking discretion,” and implying that 
rulemaking requires little judicial scrutiny because of its “political, discretionary, incremental 
nature”). 
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decisionmaking.22  Public involvement could help constrain the abuse of power 
in the administrative state.  It could be part of the process for developing 
accountability between the key constituencies of the administrative state and the 
real-world actions of its institutions.  Some form of public involvement could 
also provide regulators with valuable information about the costs, benefits, and 
administrative challenges associated with certain proposals.  Of course such 
involvement is not taken to call for some kind of direct democracy.23  On the 
contrary.  It borders on madness (one would think) to believe that members of 
the lay public could play some constructive role in regulatory policy.  But then 
what is the sort of public involvement that is legitimacy-enhancing? 
If the question is taken to mean, “what are the specific legal features 
allowing for public involvement in the administrative state?” then it is pretty 
easy to answer: formally the public can get involved in the administrative state 
through a mixture of mechanisms.  One is the notice-and-comment process that 
governs most regulatory rulemaking.24 Interest groups also have occasional direct 
contact with the agency.25  The public can also have an indirect impact through 
legislators and the president – who share power to oversee the agencies of the 
administrative state.  But how should we evaluate these structures and their real-
world operation?  Without broadening the question, we end up with something 
pretty circular: the structures that exist are adequate because those are the ones 
that exist.  If the question is understood to be more broad, in the sense of how 
these legal structures should be evaluated, then there are really two strands of 
thinking about what kind of participation contributes to legitimacy.  
The first strand is participatory democracy.  It focuses on the importance 
of involving the public at large – whether they are individuals, unofficial 
associations, organized interest groups, or powerful interested parties – in 
developing rules like those implementing Section 314.26  In this approach, broad-
based participation matters for two reasons: individual members of the public 
22 See infra Part I.
23
 And why not just a referendum on regulatory policy?  The short answer is that voters’ initial, 
uniformed, and unsophisticated impressions may not correspond with the views they would have 
given more information and a chance to talk about the issue.  When voters have time, 
information, and a chance to deliberate, their opinions often change.  See generally JAMES F. 
FISHKIN & ROBERT C. LUSKIN, BRINGING DELIBERATION TO THE DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE, IN 
THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE (Maxwell McCombs & May Reynolds eds., 1999)..  See also
Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. J. 1503 (1990).
24 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551.  Most of the exceptions to the APA notice-
and-comment rulemaking process involve foreign affairs and national security.  See id., at 
Section 553.  But as Section 314 demonstrates, some of the default requirements for rulemaking 
contained in the APA still apply to a number of regulations affecting areas ranging from criminal 
finance enforcement to immigration.
25
 Ex parte contacts are generally allowed in notice-and-comment rulemaking, but courts have 
imposed restrictions when the proceedings functionally resemble adjudication or licensing.  See, 
e.g., Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.d 221 (D.C.Cir. 1959).
26 See Part I.a, supra.
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will be affected by regulations, and policy choices should not be driven only by 
those who think in terms of their self-interest.27  Nothing here implies a need for 
direct democracy on every issue, nor is there necessarily a sense that the 
legislative process is always participatory.  But the focus here is on trying to 
ensure that regulatory policy issues attract a decent share of public attention.28
This is represented in the impulse some regulatory agencies occasionally have 
for public hearings and “town meetings” that go “past” organized interests.  
Much of the early rhetoric about the administrative state is at least consistent 
with this approach, even if it’s not exactly clear what it should mean in terms of 
institutions.
The second strand, which I call administrative pluralism, is more 
pragmatic.29  The focus is on groups and organized interests.  They do the heavy 
lifting when it comes to legitimizing rulemaking proceedings like those 
involving Section 314.  They should be expected to raise concerns ranging from 
administrability to privacy to the benefits to law enforcement that could be 
achieved through the regulation.  Public engagement means engaging those 
groups, who have a measure of responsibility and expertise to supplement what 
is considered to be a really technical, complicated, scientific process.  The 
competition between interest groups informs the regulatory process and also 
helps politicians control agency problems that they might otherwise have with 
regulatory agencies.  More so than participatory democracy, it is the 
administrative pluralism strand that calls for what the existing approach to public 
engagement is able to deliver: a chance for expert, organized interest groups to 
take part in shaping regulations.30
Despite their differences, both of these approaches have implicit positive 
and normative components.  For example, the descriptive aspect of 
administrative pluralism might be grounded on two research traditions: 
skepticism of mass democracy, and an attention to the susceptibility of the 
administrative state to control from organized interest groups (with “agency 
capture” being just one crude way of putting things).   Normatively, 
administrative pluralism takes the fact of political power vested in organized 
interest groups and suggests this is not a bad thing at all.  In any case, the larger 
point is this.  The two strands helping to define what is really meant by saying 
that public engagement is important are not just deeply felt, deontological 
positions.  They are built on particular suppositions and intuitions (both positive 
and normative), all of which can (and should) be scrutinized.
As the reader will better grasp following Part II, once such scrutiny is 
provided for its suppositions, administrative pluralism turns out not to be very 
27 Id.
28
 Which is, by the way, why this strand implies that it is not enough to emphasize the role 
representative politicians play in the oversight of the administrative state.  Mass electoral support 
rarely turns on questions of regulatory policy.  See infra Part III.a.
29 See Part I.b, supra.
30 Id.
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satisfying as the exclusive approach to involving the public in the 
administrative state, for several reasons.  First, some of its basic premises are 
questionable, or at least context-dependent.31  For example, an implicit premise 
of administrative pluralism is that agency problems between leaders and 
members of interest groups are not so great that they undermine the value of the 
participation by organized interest groups.  Yet there can be substantial agency 
problems.32  And so too with another implicit claim, which is that interest groups 
will tend to provide expert, sophisticated commentary on the most normatively 
important dimensions of a particular regulatory problem.33  But that did not 
happen with Section 314.  Not a single organization concerned about civil 
liberties and capable of submitting sophisticated comments, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union or the Electronic Frontier Foundation, provided 
comments.  Indeed, doing so is probably a lot harder in times of crisis where a 
deluge of legal changes unfold at the same time.  One can also question the 
implicit contentions that regulatory policy is primarily – if not exclusively --
about expert judgment,34 and that the larger public does not care about it.  While 
most comments came from individual people concerned about privacy, these 
comments displayed little understanding of the law or the agency’s responsibility 
under it.  In part as a result, the agency did not even address these in its Federal 
Register statement, nor did it make a single change in the proposed regulation as 
a result of these comments.35 Second, administrative pluralism is not the only 
feasible means of involving the larger public in regulatory policy, both because 
(a) the lay public’s sophistication and interest are not fixed, and (b) some groups 
that may not ordinarily participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking (like non-
aligned experts) may have both an interest and sophistication.36  Third, the 
31 See infra Part II.b.
32 See TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS __ (1981).
33 See infra Part II.b.
34 See infra Part II.b.
35 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 60579, 60580-82 (September 26, 2002) 
(discussing comments received and making no mention of privacy concerns raised by 
commenters) (hereinafter, “Section 314 Final Rule Statement”).  See the Appendix, infra, for 
examples of the comments.  Note that the vast majority of non-business comments were not 
sophisticated yet they raised recognizable themes that (a) raised an arguably important 
substantive concern with the rules (i.e., privacy).  For all their unsophistication, some comments 
even seemed to offer insights that are consistent with the positions that scholars take in academic 
debates.  For example, some commenters implied that regulatory policies can be constitutionally 
problematic even if they are consistent with a judicial conception of the Constitution.  See infra
Part II.a.  Others were concerned about unintended or even perverse consequences from law 
enforcement policies.  See id.  In any case, the commenters don’t use the “right” language.  For 
example, the ones concerned about the Constitution don’t say, “The Miller case goes too far, and 
since I’ve read Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet I believe that constitutional interpretation should 
be driven in part by the public’s own thinking – and that’s the sort of thinking I’m doing right 
here.”  But the comment is at least consistent with this more sophisticated formulation. 
36 See infra Part III.
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underlying theory of democracy involved in administrative pluralism may not 
be persuasive to everyone, or for every issue.  And in some cases this is for good 
reason.  One may believe that majoritarian deliberation should inform regulatory 
policy, or that people with an interest but no representation in the existing 
arrangement should have some representation.37
Having critiqued the administrative pluralism strand, I then consider in 
Parts III and IV how to advance realistic alternatives consistent with the 
participatory democracy strand.  I develop corrective and majoritarian 
deliberation approaches.  The corrective approach would involve designing a 
mechanism to sample people that should obviously have interest but are not 
adequately represented (with some appropriate metric for making this decision).  
The majoritarian deliberation approach would involve getting a random sample 
of the population as a whole.38  Either one of the alternative approaches could 
involve selecting a small group or groups through random sampling (or stratified 
random sampling) of some population.  In principle, individuals and groups 
consulted through these alternative approaches could offer both their raw initial 
opinions but also their reactions to information about the nature of the agency’s 
mandate, the scientific and technical problems with different regulatory 
possibilities, and the views of different constituencies that would be affected by 
the regulation.39  The existence of these alternatives does not mean the existing
approach is always wrong: letting participation be driven by self-designated 
interested parties might make sense, or it might not.  Like everything in life, 
these alternatives have costs – but they should be judged alongside their 
potential benefits.  That is exactly the point:  choosing between all these 
approaches poses the question of when it is just fine to use the existing pluralist 
approach, when we should be more interested in including people affected but 
not organized to participate, and when it is better to let regulatory decisions be 
informed by deliberation groups that are explicitly majoritarian in nature.
While there is plenty of reason to rethink public engagement, my project 
is not meant to fix all the limitations of regulatory policy by rec alibrating public 
participation.40  Enough has been written already about the virtues of dialogic 
37
 Indeed, by using the alternatives to the existing approach – which I discuss in Part IV –
agencies may be better able to do some things that could improve regulation.  Regulators could 
gain insights about how to explain regulatory functions to the public, and how to foster 
compliance with regulations.  See infra Part IV.
38 Obviously, at some level the entire population has some kind of “interest,” so the distinction 
between the two approaches is driven by how low one sets the “interest” threshold.
39
 Nothing about these alternatives makes them incompatible with principled risk analysis, or 
with defensible versions of cost-benefit analysis.  See Part IV.c. 
40
 Some commentators have pointed out that the administrative state has a bias against regulation.  
See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE AND PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
Indeed, the political economy of regulation may give agencies an incentive to systematically 
under-regulate.  I do not address this problem directly, but neither do I believe the proposals here 
would exacerbate the problem.
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deliberation.41  My goal here is not to insist that whatever ails the administrative 
state can be healed through including more stakeholders in regulatory 
policymaking or through more public deliberation.  Instead I want to show that 
the default embrace of the administrative pluralism approach to public 
participation in regulatory policy is neither indispensable nor particularly 
persuasive.  Instead of an antidote to resolve all the difficult questions in 
regulatory policy, I am offering observations about how the law of the 
administrative state shapes the process of deciding on what those difficult 
questions really are.
I.
THERE ARE TWO STRANDS OF THOUGHT ABOUT PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Not a single major function of government escapes the influence of 
regulatory policy.42  Under the existing approach to public engagement in the 
administrative state, the public gets some opportunity to participate in regulatory 
decisions affecting matters ranging from campaign contribution rules to 
carcinogen control. Because of their role authorizing statutes, appropriating 
funds, and overseeing agency activity, the legislature and the President act as 
constraints on agencies.43  Moreover, presidents hire and fire agency 
administrators.  Even members of independent agencies may be sensitive to the 
White House agenda. In most rulemaking proceedings, people and interest 
groups have a right to participate through APA notice-and-comment procedures.  
The right for the public to comment, coupled with legal requirements that the 
agency must give reasons for what it does,44 implies has some kind of legal 
responsibility to consider significant issues raised in public comments.45
41
 For a reasonable introduction to this burgeoning literature (replete with the obligatory cites to 
Habermas), see JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1996).  But see James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative 
Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421, 447 (1996).
42
 The average number of pages in the annual Code of Federal Regulations grew about 50% 
between the Ford and Clinton Administrations, from an average of 71,982 during the Ford 
administration to 134,173 during the Clinton presidency.  Kerwin, supra note ___, at 21.
43 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 235-276 (1989) (discussing how representative 
politicians act as shape and constrain the work of bureaucrats).  See also infra Part V., at ____.
44 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (agency must provide 
explanation for its decision, and decision reviewed on the basis of the full rulemaking record).  
The full record includes all the comments submitted by the public.  
45
 Let me expand on this.  It is generally accepted that an agency must consider all the important 
dimensions of a regulatory problem – and surely this includes significant dimensions of the 
problem elucidated in public comments.  See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 
375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied 417 U.S. 921 (1974).  See also Ronald M. Levin, 
Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 Duke L.J. 1497, 1501 n.19 (1992) 
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While it is clear that the public gets to participate directly through the 
notice and comment process and indirectly through representative politicians, it 
is much less clear what that participation is supposed to accomplish in the 
existing approach.  Some might say that participation breeds legitimacy, but this 
just pushes the question back one step, since there are at least two different 
strands of thinking about how public engagement promotes legitimacy.  One 
strand, which might be labeled participatory democracy, exalts the value of mass 
participation as an important ingredient in regulatory policymaking.  Whether 
through letter-writing appeals to legislators or the notice-and-comment process, 
the participatory democracy strand emphasizes the value in counterbalancing the 
natural insularity of the regulatory process.  This strand finds some support in 
the legal structures of the administrative state, which allow for participation from 
individual and informal groups as well as organized interests.  Another approach, 
which could be called “administrative pluralism,” is more pragmatic.  This 
strand not only acknowledges but lauds the role organized interests play in 
regulatory policymaking.  Administrative pluralism does not expect citizens to 
rush home from their job so that they can send in comments to some regulatory 
agency.  Instead the focus is on interested participants and the interaction 
between them.  Their competition is thought to enhance the quality and 
legitimacy of regulatory policy.  One has to disentangle these two strands to 
make any headway in understanding public engagement in the administrative 
state.    Once the two strands are disentangled, two things become clear.  First, 
administrative pluralism seems more pragmatic because it appears to be 
consistent with the way the public seems to get involved in regulatory policy.  
Second, the viability of administrative pluralism as a theory of legitimacy for the 
administrative state really depends on a number of empirical suppositions that
should be subject to scrutiny.
(citing Portland Cement Ass’n); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal 
Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 282 (1987) (agencies must 
respond to all serious dimensions of the problem raised in comments). On the other hand, courts 
tend to give agencies a good deal of discretion to decide precisely how to handle comments.  
This makes it hard to fix the precise counters of the agency’s responsibility to respond to 
individual comments.  See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1355 n.15 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (“An agency need not address every conceivable issue or alternative, no matter how 
remote or insignificant.”); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); But cf.  Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1995) (“To be sure, an agency has broad discretion to set its agenda and to 
deal with problems one step at a time.  Nevertheless, the agency's self-interest lies in making a 
strong record to respond to pleas to go further than it would prefer; brushing such comments 
aside can be counterproductive.”) (footnote omitted).  What must be reconciled is (a) the 
agency’s responsibility to consider important dimensions of the problem, (b) the public’s right to 
comment, and (c) the agency’s discretion in handling individual comments.  Perhaps the most 
viable way to reconcile these legal principles is to conclude that the agency may not ignore 
qualitatively important dimensions of the problem that raised in the course of the notice-and-
comment process (i.e., by some substantial proportion of the comments in the aggregate).  
Moreover, if the notice-and-comment process is supposed to serve a valuable function 
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A.  The Participatory Democracy Strand Emphasizes the Value of Participation 
by Individuals, Informal Associations, and Organized Interests
If we must accept an administrative state of faceless bureaucratic 
administrative agencies, how can we ensure that its decisions are both sound and 
legitimate? Proponents of the administrative state and courts reviewing 
administrative decisions have often emphasized the importance of participatory 
democracy in the administrative state as part of the answer.  By “participatory 
democracy,” I mean some kind of process allowing individuals, informal 
associations, and organized interests to have a say in regulatory policy.  
Participation (goes the theory) is central to democracy,46 and thus crucial to 
reconciling democratic aspirations with the bureaucratic machinery of the 
administrative state.
Defenders of the administrative state suggest that it is more legitimate 
because of such participation.  So do courts reviewing administrative action.  
Indeed, the mechanisms of the administrative state seem to reflect a concern with 
some kind of participatory democracy.  With few exceptions, members of the 
public have a legal right to take part in the regulatory process, regardless of 
whether they are savvy lawyers for a chemical products company or individual 
laypeople people with no particular technical expertise.47  This makes intuitive 
sense, since regulations are forged from statutes passed in the name of 
everyone.48  The regulations themselves are obviously important: often they have 
the force of law just as a civil or criminal statute would.49  They affect a 
pervasive and growing share of the nation’s domestic and international 
decisions.  Participation helps render that power legitimate in two ways.  
Regulations affect the public and are promulgated in its name; members of the 
public should therefore be able to affect the regulation because they have an 
46 See SIDNEY VERBA, KAY SCHLOZMAN, AND HENRY BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC 
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1995)(“Citizen participation is at the heart of 
democracy.  Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely 
in the governing process.”). 
47
 Most of the exceptions to the APA notice-and-comment rulemaking process involve foreign 
affairs and national security.  But as Section 314 demonstrates, some of the default requirements 
for rulemaking contained in the APA still apply to a number of regulations affecting areas 
ranging from criminal finance enforcement to immigration.
48
 By “regulations,” I mean primarily the regulatory rules enacted pursuant to the notice-and-
comment process (also known as “informal rulemaking”) established by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, or pursuant to a similar process that allows the public to participate in rulemaking 
in some way.  
49 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law:  
The Original Convention 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).
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interest in the regulation.50  And mass participation can offset self-interested 
political activity involving organized interests, helping to offset this with some 
sort of deliberative citizen activity. 
At least in some ways, the structure of the administrative state is set up to 
force it to react to citizen participation in administrative decisions.  Legislators 
can influence the work of agencies in response to a rare but powerful burst of 
public attention to some matter of regulatory policy.  Agencies are legally 
required to consider comments raising important issues, regardless of who they 
come from.  Of course, nothing in the participatory democracy strand makes 
participation infinitely valuable: after some point decisions must be taken, and 
policies must be executed.51  What this strand seems to imply is rather that 
efficiency values should be balanced against the importance of participation, and 
that such participation should regularly allow people to have an effect on 
regulatory policy.  If the existing notice-and-comment, expertise-focused 
structure of administrative law does not allow this to happen, then people 
interested in participatory democracy would ask what alternatives exist that 
could blend expert technical judgment with opportunities for public involvement 
in decisionmaking.  Thus the impulse for occasional experiments like the Carter 
Administration’s drive for expanded public hearings and television advertising 
soliciting public comments on regulations,52 or the more recent use of 
50 See Kerwin, supra note ___, at 158 (“The credibility and standing a rule enjoys with those who 
will be regulated by it or enjoy the benefits it bestows depend heavily on the accuracy and 
completeness of the information on which it is based”).
51
 As I have defined it, this “participatory democracy’ strand is potentially consistent with the 
resent enthusiasm for deliberative democracy.  See, e.g., JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC 
DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996).  But the “participatory 
democracy” strand does not depend on some sort of deep, slow deliberation as much as on 
participation in the process of decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic 
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002).  Justice Breyer writes:
Serious complex challenges in law are often made in the context of a national 
conversation, involving, among others, scientists, engineers, businessmen and –women, 
and the media, along with legislators, judges, and many ordinary citizens…  That 
conversation takes place through many meetings, symposia, and discussions, through 
journal articles and media reports, through legislative hearings and court cases. 
[Emphasis added].
Justice Breyer’s list could well have included the notice-and-comment process or its close 
cousins like negotiated rulemaking.  His vision seems to depend less on the notion that people 
can participate in the “national conversation,” whether they are scientists or “ordinary citizens.”
52
 President Carter issued an executive order directing agencies to explore “holding open 
conferences or public hearings” to expand the scope of participation.  See Exec. Order 12,044.  
The Carter reforms led to increases in the time for comment for many rules, the provision of 
advance notice that an agency was considering rulemaking in a certain area, and occasional use 
of television and radio advertising soliciting comments.  See Kerwin, supra note___, at 169 
(discussing Carter-era innovations).
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“deliberative polls” to advise state utility regulators.53  And while direct 
democracy may seem ill-suited for some regulatory issues, it certainly seems like 
a procedure that imbues a decision with legitimacy.54
The deeper question that arises from this first strand is whether it is 
mostly just an aspirational standard -- a philosophical ideal that makes the 
administrative state sound benign to people.  Despite the Carter reforms and 
other occasional experiments, laypeople as a whole hardly seem to have a 
persistent interest in regulation or technical sophistication to make meaningful 
contributions to particulate emission standards, FCC media ownership rules, or 
technical changes in campaign finance law.  Even stakeholders trying to 
participate – whether they are experts or people more directly affected by a 
decision – may be drowned out by the power of organized interests who have 
overcome any collective action problems.  To the extent that laypeople seem 
uninterested and unsophisticated, and unorganized stakeholders appear doomed 
to be drowned out by organized interests, then participatory democracy seems 
unrealistic at best.
B. The Administrative Pluralism Strand Focuses on the Role of Organized 
Interests
There is, nonetheless, a more pragmatic alternative to simply singing the 
praises of participatory democracy in the administrative state.  A substantial 
chunk of the empirical and theoretical research on the administrative state 
emphasizes the role that interest groups play in shaping regulatory policy.55  A 
lot people have understandably concluded believe that organized interests have 
disproportionate power in shaping regulations like the Section 314 rules, 
compared to the lay public or to interested individuals or organized groups that 
lack organization and political resources.  What makes the “administrative 
pluralism” strand of thinking about public engagement distinctive is not its 
recognition of the role interested parties play its tendency to equate the positive 
53 See generally Robert C. Luskin, James Fishkin, & Dennis L. Plane, Deliberative Polling and 
Policy Outcomes:  Electric Utility Issues in Texas, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (Nov. 1999) (on file with author) 
(describing changes in the opinions of a sample of people asked to consider electric utility 
pricing issues in Texas, following the provision of materials to the participants and a chance for 
them to deliberate about the issue).
54 See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
55
 There is a vast literature here addressing the role of interest groups in regulatory policy.  The 
following are a few interesting examples.  See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in 
Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094 (1985);  Mathew D. 
McCubbins, The Legislative Design or Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 721 (1985); 
Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 588 (1989).
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with the normative.  Echoing Dahl and other pluralist thinkers,56 proponents of 
this view emphasize that interest group competition is probably the best (if not 
the only viable) way to integrate the public in complex regulatory and 
administrative decisionmaking.57  This is the sort of view that made the early 
architects of the Administrative Procedure Act celebrate the fact that – even 
before the structure of the modern administrative state had been formalized –
many agencies had realized that their success as regulators depended on 
consulting with interested parties that had both a stake in the outcome of the 
regulatory process and the requisite expertise to inform that process.58
Some of the positive theory is fairly persuasive.59  The institutions of the 
administrative state seem to be politically efficient: they help legislators know 
what sort of regulatory policy is being imposed and how the most important 
political constituencies will react to the regulations.  The existing mechanism for 
engaging the public seems perfectly suited to allowing organized interest groups 
to participate at various stages in the process: at the time legislation is written in 
the first place, later through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process that 
applies to most regulatory rules, and then subsequently through litigation and 
informal efforts to shape agency enforcement policy.60  The harder question is 
56 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, American Hybrid, in CLASSIC READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 205, 
219 (Pietro S. Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom, eds. 1990) (“I  defined the ‘normal’ American 
political process as one in which there is a high probability that an activate and legitimate group 
in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of 
decision”).  Dahl not only describes interest group competition as a pervasive feature of the 
American political system.  He also exalts this feature:
[T]he normal American political system… appears to be a relatively efficient system for 
reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a 
restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified and 
incredibly complex society.  This is no negligible contribution, then, that Americans 
have made to the arts of government – and to that branch, which of all the arts of 
politics is the most difficult, the art of democratic governance.
Id., at 222.
57 See, e.g., Edward P. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001); Peter H. 
Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL. REV. 
553, 554 (1997)(“The provision of strong protection for a strongly reviled system of special 
interest politics thus appears to be less a paradox than an example, familiar in our system, of a 
sound political and constitutional commitment to take some risks and to bear some costs in return 
for larger social benefits.”). 
58 See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 103-04  (1941) (hereinafter, “ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT”).   See also Kerwin, 
supra note ___, at 158 (noting that the lack of participation from interested parties may result in a 
rule “deprived of information that is crucial…”).
59 See infra Part V.a.
60
 An advocate of the more ambitious participatory democracy approach might note that the 
formal institutions of the administrative state – such as the notice-and-comment process -- are set 
up to engage individuals and informal groups, not only interest groups.  Rarely if ever does the 
law of the administrative explicitly restrict participation to interest groups.  On the contrary: in 
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whether this arrangement is satisfactory in any deeper sense.  It’s possible to 
state a version of administrative pluralism like this: any degree of participation 
in regulatory policy is just fine, as long as agencies fulfill the legal requirements 
for issuing regulatory policies.  After all, those legal requirements call on 
agencies to contend with any serious issue raised in the rulemaking record.61
In contrast, a richer understanding of administrative pluralism would 
concern itself with the role that organized interests should play in the whole 
enterprise of democracy.  An adherent of administrative pluralism must 
ultimately believe in the power of groups and organized interests to enrich the 
process that serves up the Section 314 rules.  To believe in administrative
pluralism, one has to believe to some extent there are no devastating agency 
problems in the relationship between interest-group members and leaders.  One 
must also believe in the social value of allowing competing interests to 
contribute their ideas, influence, and distinctive points of view to a regulatory 
process that is otherwise primarily driven by expert judgment.  While both of 
these assumptions are contestable, at least a few things could keep the 
administrative pluralism model looking like a pretty desirable approach to 
participatory democracy.  The agency problems might be assuaged by the fact 
that interest groups have to compete for members, and at least a few interests –
such as large corporations, select not-for-profit associations, and highly-
motivated individuals – have the options of representing themselves directly.  
Either way the agency has to respond to serious concerns.  Moreover, while 
involvement in the regulatory process by interested parties may raise the specter 
of agency “capture,” perhaps the antidote is to be found in competition.  Thus, 
while individual citizens with diffuse interests may not be able to contribute 
much to a regulatory proceeding on air quality, industry and environmental 
groups would have the resources to participate with the requisite technical 
sophistication.  They could challenge each others’ assumptions and provide the 
agency with new information, and blow the whistle if the agency neglected an 
important aspect of the problem.  
Indeed, there might be a few important reasons why this reliance on 
organized interests should be perfectly acceptable, at least to some people.  One 
might think that virtually all the work of the administrative state requires highly-
most cases, interest groups get to participate because the individuals they represent would have a 
chance to participate – whether because they have the standing to get judicial review or because 
the public at large has the power to submit their views during the notice-and-comment period.  
What the interest groups are supposed to do is to solve the collective action problems that would 
otherwise keep most individuals from following regulatory developments that would have an 
effect on them.
61
 As one established doctrinal summary of the field put it: “Most remands [of regulatory rules] 
are based on a court’s conclusion that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency did 
not discuss ‘adequately’ some decisional factor, comment, data dispute, or potential alternative to 
the action taken in the rule”  RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, AND PAUL R. 
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 334 (1999).
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sophisticated technical expertise anyway, which raises questions about just how 
much we achieve by stepping up the involvement of the mass public in 
regulatory policy.  That’s how courts tend to talk about regulatory policy.62  It 
could be that interest groups are the only ones (along with directly interested
parties) with the means and incentives to solve collective action problems to 
learn about the issues, organize a response, and otherwise meaningfully take part 
in regulatory policymaking.  Moreover, the views of interest groups are often in 
conflict, so various interests might police each other throughout the regulatory 
process – including during the notice-and-comment process.  Or at least this is 
supposed to be true in the administrative pluralist version of the world.
C.  Each Strand Reflects a Theory of Administrative Legitimacy
The preceding approaches to public engagement are more than just 
descriptions of what sort of public involvement is supposed to be possible.  They 
are also theories of legitimacy.  No reasonable defender of the administrative
state’s legitimacy has suggested that the public (whether we think of them as 
groups or individuals) should be completely screened out of being involved in 
regulatory decisions.  Nor would such exclusion be politically feasible in a 
system like our own.63  But if complete exclusion of the public is neither possible 
nor desirable, the question is then how we might expect the public to get 
involved in these decisions. 
If we look at the existing approach to getting the public involved – with 
its expert decisionmaking, and public comment process -- it seems most 
consistent with administrative pluralism.  Notice-and-comment rulemaking 
allows interested parties that solve collective action problems to play a role, 
supplementing whatever else they do ex parte and through legislative pressure.  
Laypeople may not make sophisticated contributions to rulemaking, but 
competing interest groups do so.  Expert decisionmaking is considered the key 
task of the administrative state by courts and in many cases by the agencies
themselves.  And yet intellectually honest observers have to conclude that the 
attractiveness of administrative pluralism depends substantially on its empirical 
assumptions.  Notice that neither these assumptions nor the attractiveness of the 
administrative pluralism model itself should be considered in binary terms.  
There is some need for subtlety in judging these different strands of thinking 
about participation in the administrative state.  Nonetheless, if the intuitions 
62 See, e.g., Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115 
(1985) (upholding agency decision regarding an unfair labor practice because the “Board has the 
primary responsibility for applying ‘the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of 
industrial life’”); National Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming 
dismissal of a complaint against a Justice Department practice of creating a temporary audit log 
of gun purchasers, on the ground that “it is the agencies, not the courts, that have the technical 
expertise… to carry out statutory mandates”).
63 See Part V.b, infra.
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listed above turned out to be wrong, it would be harder to defend the 
administrative pluralism strand – which would then suggest the need to 
rethinking how the administrative state achieves public engagement.  
One might thus group the potential problems with this second strand into 
two categories.  First, how persuasive are the underlying assumptions of the 
second strand?  Even if these turn out to be relatively convincing, how 
persuasive is the underlying interest-group centered vision of democracy that is 
implied by the administrative pluralism approach?   We can get a better sense of 
how these assumptions fare if we turn to a specific case study.  Since the case 
study may seem to raise issues that are less commonly seen in administrative law 
(i.e., law enforcement, national security, the war on terrorism), I also spend a 
little time placing the case study in context and trying to show why the problems 
raised in the case study are not as unique as they might seem.
II.
A CASE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS SOME LIMITATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLURALISM
In this Part, I examine the questions raised by the two strands of thinking 
about public engagement in light of the experience with Section 314. To do this, 
I place Section 314 in the broader context of scholarship on the reality of the 
regulatory process.  I then consider how the experiences with regulatory policy 
conform to the implicit intuitions of the administrative pluralism model, which 
implies, for example, that concerns raised in the comments will be addressed and 
that sophisticated interest groups will articulate the concerns that should be 
relevant to the regulatory process.  This exercise shows that the intuitions 
supporting the administrative pluralism model turn out to be rather shaky.  The 
results are revealing: though the number of comments was small (172), the vast 
majority (over 70%) came from unsophisticated laypeople concerned about 
privacy.  The agency appears to have ignored these, instead lavishing attention 
on sophisticated comments from businesses and their representatives.  
A. Section 314 Caused Regulators to Revise Law Enforcement Power to 
Obtain Private Financial Information
I chose this case study because the rule is one that applies to virtually 
anyone in the country, because the issue in question is timely and obviously 
requires balancing various competing values, and because the statute gives the 
agency a lot of latitude with the rule.  Although regulatory rulemaking 
proceedings involving law enforcement and national security may seem at first 
to raise unique issues, below I try to show how the case study sheds light on all 
of administrative law.  Where there may be important differences in terms of 
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relevance to the questions, I have noted them.  The appendix describes the 
methods I used to analyze the relevant comments.
i.  The problem and the statute
Growing fears of crime and terrorism among legislators and the public
provoke a sense of urgency about law enforcement.  That urgency extends to 
both (ex ante) preventive investigation and (ex post) prosecution.  Financial data
are definitely useful in after-the-fact enforcement, where prosecutors must 
establish the elements of various offenses and prove their theory of the case, and 
is probably also somewhat useful in preventive investigation.64 But before 
September 11, the question of government access to financial information for 
national security or criminal enforcement purposes created some frustration for 
law enforcement officials.  Sometimes law enforcement investigators working on 
ex post enforcement had a hard time actually getting the records of people who 
were being investigated, because defendants did not always tell authorities where 
they had accounts.  It was harder still to get access to financial records of 
suspects: that required a judicial subpoena, which in turn required authorities to 
figure out where their suspect engaged in financial activity and (in most cases) 
required persons whose records were targeted to receive notice and have a 
chance to oppose the subpoena in court.65
Meanwhile, some financial institutions insisted that they did not know 
what (if any) information they could share with other financial institutions 
regarding people they considered suspicious, or whether they could act on such 
information (for example) to close the accounts of suspicious people.  One might 
wonder why such institutions would be interested in sharing information at all.  
One possibility is that the prospects of subsequent government investigations 
leading to possible civil or criminal liability, coupled with the potential for bad 
publicity, might give rise to such pressures.  Although the Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR) system already had its own safe harbor provision, there were 
still questions about a financial institutions civil or criminal liability if it 
accepted business that had raised red flags at other financial institutions.  
Moreover, there was the slight chance that taking on a customer who turned out 
to be using her bank account to engage in criminal financial activity of some 
kind would lead to public embarrassment.  
For all these pre-September 11 frustrations in using financial data to 
advance law enforcement goals, the executive branch could take at least small 
steps to address these concerns.  It could use computers to analyze currency 
64
 In other work I chronicle how law enforcers tend to use financial records for ex post rather than 
ex ante (i.e., preventive) enforcement, despite the official insistence that financial records are 
useful for both .  See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight 
Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2003). 
65 See infra notes___.
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transaction records collected subject to existing regulatory authorities – but 
these provide only a tiny snapshot of the aggregate financial transactions in the 
country, the vast majority of which do not involve physical currency.  Law 
enforcement bureaucracies could also try to expedite the process for obtaining 
judicial subpoenas for financial records of suspected criminals.  If law 
enforcement agents knew where a suspect kept accounts and had enough 
suspicion, then they could obtain a judicial subpoena for her records.66  But there 
was no enactment of broad statutory authority allowing some regulatory agency 
to prescribe uniform rules governing the mass dissemination of a request to all 
(or most) financial institutions in the country.67  Doing a nationwide subpoena 
was questionable at best, on both legal and practical grounds.68  In fact, efforts to 
streamline this sort of activity raised some warning flags for politicians and 
outside interest groups.  For example, while financial institutions might be 
interested in further expanding the scope of their safe harbors (so they would not 
have to face liability if they voluntarily chose to share information), they were 
certainly not interested in being saddled with further legal obligations to provide 
records to government.  
The September 11 attacks precipitated a staggering burst of legislative 
activity.  Many legislative changes involving law enforcement and national 
security became possible that had previously not been politically-feasible.  
September 11 even dramatized the potential costs that could be faced by a 
private-sector entity thought to be unwittingly responsible for the tragedy, which 
probably heightened financial institutions’ interest in sharing information and 
66
 Under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq. (hereinafter, “RFPA”), 
such a subpoena would ordinarily give notification to the person whose records are requested, as 
well as a chance to fight the subpoena in court.  See generally Laura N. Pringle and Conni L. 
Allen, Privacy and Related Issues for Financial Institutions and Other Regulated Entities, 53 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 28 (1999).
67
 The impact of such a rule obviously depends on how broadly one defines “financial 
institution.”  Although this may seem like a straightforward matter, even the original Bank 
Secrecy Act gives Treasury wide latitude over how to define a financial institution.  See Bank 
Secrecy Act (hereinafter “BSA”), 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312.  The statute gives Treasury the power to 
define “financial institution” to include, among other entities, commercial banks and trust 
companies, private banks, branches of foreign banks in the U.S., investment bankers, insurance 
companies, travel agencies, licensed money transmitters, casinos, or:
any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the 
Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a 
substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is 
authorized to engage; or any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash 
transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.
68
 Before 2002, there was no nationwide system allowing law enforcement agencies to 
communicate a request for records to all financial institutions in the country, nor any legal 
requirement that financial institutions cooperate with law enforcement authorities in searching 
their records for information.  On the contrary, RFPA established notable restrictions on the 
disclosure of any such information.
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otherwise minimizing the probability that they might turn out to be Osama bin 
Laden’s personal banker.  Financial institutions that had previously opposed 
expanding government request powers might now find it difficult to be 
completely opposed to this (given how popular the USA Patriot Act would be), 
but if the legislation provided for broad authority to be exercised by regulators, 
then they had another chance to shape the actual enforcement consequences of 
the statute.  And so we end up with the USAPA, and its Section 314.
What Section 314 does is to give the Treasury Department the authority 
to encourage information sharing between financial institutions and the federal 
government, and among different financial institutions.  Section 314(a) 
establishes authority for Treasury to create rules for the request and sharing of 
financial information between financial institutions and law enforcement.69
Specifically, Section 314(a)(1) provides in part that: 
[T]he Secretary shall… adopt regulations to encourage further 
cooperation among financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and 
law enforcement authorities, with the specific purpose of encouraging 
regulatory authorities and law enforcement authorities to share with 
financial institutions information regarding individuals, entities, and 
organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected based on credible 
evidence of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.70
A fuller picture emerges when we consider what Section 314(a)(2)(C) states:
[The regulations may] include or create procedures for cooperation and 
information focusing on…. Means of facilitating the identification of 
accounts and transactions involving terrorist groups and facilitating the 
exchange of information concerning such accounts and transactions 
between financial institutions and law enforcement organizations.71
While subsection (a) addresses the link between financial institutions and 
federal authorities, Section 314(b) directs Treasury to develop rules for the 
sharing of information among financial institutions in the interest of preventing 
money laundering or terrorist financing.72  Under the statute, the regulations can 
69 See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56  (USAPA).  Section 314 of the Act is an 
uncodified provision that appears in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 31 U.S.C. 5311.  
Section 5311 is part of the BSA, and regulations implementing it appear at 31 CFR part 103.  
Since the authority of the Treasury Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the 
Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), then FinCEN has 
responsibility for developing the regulations under Section 314.  
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
24
allow such information-sharing to take place pursuant to a safe-harbor from 
legal liability for the institutions sharing the information.  It provides:
Upon notice provided to the Secretary, 2 or more financial institutions 
and any association of financial institutions may share information with 
one another regarding individuals, entities, organizations, and countries 
suspected of possible terrorist or money laundering activities.  A 
financial institution or association that transmits, receives, or shares such 
information for the purposes of identifying and reporting activities shall 
not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United 
States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political 
subdivision thereof, or under any contract or other legally enforceable 
agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for such disclosure or 
for any failure to provide notice of such disclosure, or any other person 
identified in the disclosure, except where such transmission, receipt, or 
sharing violates this section or regulations promulgated pursuant to this 
section.
The potential impact of Section 314(a) starts to emerge clearly if we 
think about the rules affecting how federal agents could get their hands on 
records before the legislation.  For the most part, they had to use a subpoena, 
which meant federal law enforcement agents needed at least some ex ante 
suspicions about where the suspected wrongdoer might have her records. The 
latter could then be challenged in court, and the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
further provides for the challenge of a request for financial records.73 In contrast, 
Section 314(a) could make it easier for law enforcement to get information from 
any bank in the country.  That authority might be restricted to instances where 
law enforcement bureaucracies certify that the person whose records they want is 
credibly thought to be engaging in money laundering or terrorism,74 but the 
statute does not provide any remedy for a failure in the law enforcement 
73
 The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, previously restricted financial 
institutions from disclosing a person’s financial information to the government unless the records 
were disclosed pursuant to a subpoena or a search warrant.  Depending  on the details of the 
regulations implementing Section 314(a), then, federal officials might easily sidestep the existing 
restrictions on information disclosure in the RFPA.  
74
 Section 314(a)(1) explicitly notes that information sharing should only cover people on 
“individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected based on credible 
evidence of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.”  Section 314(2) states that 
information sharing procedures may focus on “matters specifically related to the finances of 
terrorist groups” (Section 314(2)(A)); “the relationship… between international narcotics 
traffickers and foreign terrorist organizations…” (Section 314(2)(B)); or “accounts and 
transactions involving terrorist groups.”  Although someone might argue about the precise extent 
of the preceding list’s restrictions on information disclosure, the most plausible explanation for 
why those apparent limits are in the statute is that legislators wanted to restrict the scope of 
disclosed financial information. 
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certification process.75  In short, Section 314(a) at least authorizes the creation 
of a simple means for law enforcement agents to “tell” banks what accounts to 
scrutinize with particular care.  The payoff from this may be specific 
information, but also an implicit signal to financial institutions about whom they 
should scrutinize carefully.  
If sharing information with government is valuable, presumably so too is 
sharing of information among private sector financial institutions.  In a nutshell, 
Section 314(b) gives Treasury the regulatory authority to set up a system for 
financial institutions to share information among themselves.76  How much they 
actually do that obviously depends on their incentives.  But in a world where the 
potential penalty for unwittingly providing a haven for terrorist or criminal 
financial transactions may include not only a fine but also public disapproval, 
one might imagine that financial institutions might be interested in sharing 
information to minimize the risk of fallout.  Such motivations might be patriotic 
or simply a means of minimizing economic and political costs.  Either way, 
those motivations have to be adjusted for the risk of liability that a financial 
institution might face by disclosing financial information that would otherwise 
be private.  Thus we might expect financial institutions to do whatever possible 
to avoid being caught between government policies encouraging the sharing of 
information and potential liability to customers for having disclosed the 
information.
But if one is not going to be economically impacted by Section 314, why 
spend any time thinking about it at all?  Consider a few reasons why members of 
the public might be quite interested.  Section 314 is part of a trend reducing the 
barriers faced by government to obtain information, which triggers what are 
commonly referred to as “civil liberties” concerns.  Some of those concerns are 
about privacy.  Some are about false positives, including the concerns of people 
whose allegedly suspicious behavior might prompt many banks to deny them 
services.  Other concerns might arise from the fear of surveillance and 
harassment on the basis of improper motives, or unwarranted enforcement 
patterns, in which case the alleged harm isn’t just that someone who works for 
75
 Cf. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2277 (2002).  Gonzaga
concerned the privacy interests that people claimed under the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.  A former university student sued under Section 1983, alleging 
that the university had violated his rights under the statute.  The Court held that, absent specific 
“rights-creating” language, a statute did not create an right enforceable under Section 1983 (or 
through an implied right of action).  See id. at 2275.  Even if the statute includes “rights creating” 
language, the plaintiff must show Congress also intended to create a “private remedy.”   Id. at 
2276.  There might be a theory under which a sufficiently egregious bad faith violation of the 
details of Section 314(a)’s limitations might give rise to a constitutional tort.  But that’s at the 
extreme, and in any case it would be difficult for anyone aggrieved to discover the facts 
necessary to make out such a claim (under Bivens).  Anything short of that would have to be 
resolved by a remedy created through the statute (which does not provide for a remedy) or the 
regulation (which could). 
76 See Section 314(b), supra note 72.
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the government can get her eyeballs on where someone’s transferred money, 
but that the information can lead to enforcement patterns that might be troubling.  
Still other problems might involve the so-called “slippery slope,” a dynamic that 
can link Section 314 to more ominous and protracted legal changes.77  It is also 
plausible that Section 314 and measures like it allow the government to improve 
its capacity to deter offenses, because it would allow the government to more 
easily ascertain how much money people have – and such money could subject 
to confiscation. 
In addition, Section 314 could interact with other legal provisions and 
bureaucratic practices that might shape how law enforcement functions.  This 
might be good or bad depending on one’s underlying concerns about law 
enforcement.  On the one hand, if law enforcement can do more things to people 
on the basis of suspicion with less judicial review, then perhaps there is more 
reason to be concerned about law enforcement access to records that can spark 
suspicion.  Regardless of whether the initial suspicion was about terrorism or 
money laundering (as the statute requires, in principle), any criminal violation 
can be charged once it’s discovered.78  On the other hand, given a steady and 
substantial demand for enforcement performance, different detection strategies 
can be substitutes for each other.  This raises the possibility that financial 
surveillance (to pick one example) might be a substitute for techniques such as 
preventive detention, voice communication wiretaps, or physical dragnets.  
Whether this is good or bad depends on one’s outlook.  How then did the agency 
treat these different kinds of issues?
ii.  The proposed regulation
Notice the scope of flexibility that Section 314 leaves the agency.  It 
directs the agency to consider law enforcement and national security benefits but 
also gives it explicit commands to limit the scope of information made available 
to that which pertains to people reasonably believed to be terrorists (including 
their financial supporters) or money launderers.  Though the statute does not 
mention privacy in so many words, it does indicate that the power granted to law 
enforcement to request or share information is under restrictions.  The larger 
statutory framework obviously evinces a concern with privacy and non-
arbitrariness.79
77See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 
(2003).
78 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
79
 For example, although Section 314(b) provides a safe harbor for financial institutions sharing 
information, it restricts the uses of the information provided and prohibits it from being 
disclosed.  The rest of USAPA also makes some concessions to privacy.  For example, regarding 
USAPA’s concern with privacy in the context of electronic surveillance, see, e.g., Orin Kerr, 
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. 
LAW REV. 607 (2003).  Obviously this does not mean the statute is what civil libertarians would 
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The initial draft regulations took the statutory mandate to “encourage” 
cooperation and mostly turned it into a mechanism for getting information to law 
enforcement.  The proposal regulations had two major features.  First, they 
would facilitate blanket, nationwide law enforcement queries to financial 
institutions regarding account information of people suspected of being involved 
in money laundering and terrorist financing.80 Upon finding the records of the 
person in question, the financial institution would have to turn over any 
information gleaned from the customer when the account was established, and 
information about transactions made through the account.81 Information requests 
could therefore become quite routine.82  Not that the customer whose requests 
would ever know that, because the regulations forbid the requested financial 
institution from communicating the request with the customer.  What the 
financial institution can do is use the information to make a number of decisions 
on its own, such as deciding not to offer baking services to a person.  This could 
turn the provisions of part 103.100 into something like a warning to financial 
institutions not to offer services to someone.  Second, although law enforcement 
authorities must certify that all persons whose account information is requested 
are suspects of terrorism or money laundering, there is no obvious remedy for 
any violation.  As observed earlier, there is no constitutional expectation of 
privacy in records held by a third party.  This means FinCEN and law 
like.  But neither can one assume that the statute reflects no concern about privacy.  Section 314 
is therefore just one example where the regulatory agency charged with developing rules about 
USAPA’s provisions could conceivably consider privacy and civil liberties concerns.
80 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 9879, avail. at 2002 WL 331533(FR) 
(March 4, 2002) (hereinafter “Section 314 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”).  
81 Id.
82 See id. at 9884.  Specifically, proposed Section 103.100 provides in relevant part as follows:
(b) Requests for information relating to money laundering or terrorist activities.  On 
behalf of a federal law enforcement agency investigating money laundering or terrorist 
activity, FinCEN may require any financial institution to search its records to determine 
whether the financial institution maintains or has maintained accounts for, or has 
engaged in transactions with, any specified individual, entity, or organization.
(c) Certification requirement.  Prior to FinCEN requesting information… the federal law 
enforcement agency shall provide FinCEN with a written certification… that each 
individual, entity, or organization about which the agency is seeking information is 
engaged in, or reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in, money 
laundering or terrorist activity.
No additional certification is required from federal law enforcement agencies, nor do the 
regulations establish any procedures to audit the extent to which law enforcement agencies have 
a basis for suspecting the individuals, entities, or organizations in question.  Subsequent portions 
of the proposed Section 103.100 provide that the financial institution must provide FinCEN with, 
among other things, all identifying information used by the account holder to establish the 
account, and information involving transactions connected to the account.  Id.
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enforcement agencies must police themselves when it comes to the limits of the 
justification for information requests.  The absence of a remedy means no one 
else will have much of a chance to discipline anyone in government who abuses 
Section 103.100 by making unjustified requests for information.83
Meanwhile, Part 103.110 of the draft regulation established the rule 
implementing Section 314(b).  The regulations establish a legal safe harbor for 
many different types of financial institutions to share information among 
themselves relating to suspected money laundering or terrorist activity.84  To 
avail themselves of the safe-harbor under the proposed regulation, financial 
institutions had to “certify” to FinCEN that they were going to engage in 
information sharing and that they would not use the information improperly.85
iii.  The resulting regulation
Then came the required comment period,86 after which the final 
regulations were published in the Federal Register.  The revised regulations 
looked a lot like the original ones.  But they involved four major changes:
1. The regulations (especially 103.100) were reorganized for clarity.  
Specifically, financial institutions’ obligations to provide information 
under Section 314 are now grouped in a single paragraph.87
2. The regulations added some default rules restricting the scope of what a 
financial institution would have to provide when receiving a request from 
the government, unless a request specifically provides otherwise.88  There 
are two default rules.  One default rule says a financial institution only 
needs to search its records for current accounts or accounts held during 
the last twelve months, or transactions taking place during the preceding 
83 See supra note 75 (discussing Gonzaga).  Note that in Gonzaga, the presumption of a remedy 
would have been even stronger since the alleged violation of the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) was committed by a state government, thereby making § 1983 applicable 
at least in principle.  Since that would not be applicable here, then the only remaining route is a 
Bivens action. 
84 See Section 314 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, at 9885.  The Section 103.110 proposal 
states, in relevant part that:
…[a] financial institution or association of financial institutions that engages in the 
sharing of nformation pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any person under any 
law or regulation of the United States, under any constitution, law, or regulation of any 
State or political subdivision thereof, or under any contract or other legally enforceable 
agreement…
85 Id.
86 See APA § 553 et seq.
87 See , Section 314 Final Rule Statement, supra note __, at 60580.
88 Id.
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six months.  Another default rule says that financial institutions need not 
report a customer’s future activity unless the information request from 
law enforcement (emanating through FinCEN) specifically asks for such 
future information.89
3. The final regulations also expand the kinds of financial institutions that 
can share information and avoid liability for doing so.90  The new 
regulation encompasses all financial institutions that are required to 
maintain an “anti-money laundering” program (which turns out to be a 
lot more than, for example, commercial banks), unless FinCEN 
specifically “determines that a particular category of financial institution 
should not be eligible to share information under this provision.
4. The final regulations streamline the certification process, through which 
financial institutions opt-in to the information-sharing program.91  Under 
the final regulation, the requirement is simply that financial institutions 
provide FinCEN with notice that they will be engaged in information 
sharing (and there is no way to revoke this), and that they make 
reasonable efforts to establish if a financial institution with which they 
are sharing information has also given FinCEN adequate notice.
One could argue that all of these changes seem like improvements over 
the initial rule, at least according to a defensible standard of administrability.  
Regrouping the financial institutions’ obligations in a single paragraph may be a 
small thing but it probably makes the regulation easier to read.  The use of 
default rules is a more meaningful step for financial institutions – and law 
enforcement authorities do not lose the ability to ask financial institutions to 
make longer-term searches or report on future activity.  And if sharing 
information among institutions is supposed to improve security, then surely it is 
plausible to expand the scope of the “financial institutions” that can take 
advantage of the safe harbor.  FinCEN’s own explanations in the Federal 
Register discuss why these changes are justified, and credits particular comments 
for illuminating the need for the various changes.92  What is more, some of the 
comments were specifically seeking the sorts of changes that FinCEN made in 
the rule.93
B. The Administrative Pluralism Model Should be Assessed in Light of the Case 
Study and Some Fundamental Questions
89 Id.  Note that this means the regulations imply that law enforcement may use FinCEN to make 
a request for future information, because a default nature by its own terms can be altered.     
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 60580-82.
93 Id. at 60580. 
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Now let’s return to some of the questions I posed above regarding 
administrative pluralism and the interest-group focused approach to public 
engagement that it supports.  My assumption here is that administrative 
pluralism requires a qualitative evaluation.  The answers to certain questions 
may shed light on the implicit claims of the administrative pluralism model –
particularly the claim that it is the only reasonable approach to participatory 
democracy in the administrative state.   
i.  How pervasive is the role of technical and scientific decisionmaking in 
the administrative state?
Routine regulatory problems resolved through rulemaking involve 
complex judgments about risk and value that probably benefit from expertise, 
but they also involve policy judgments that often reflect ambiguous statutory 
commands.  Sometimes judges explicitly recognize the importance of policy 
judgments but note that the agency should make them because is rendered 
accountable through representative politics (in keeping with the administrative 
pluralism model).94  But most of the time courts defer to agencies, invoking 
expertise and institutional competence as justification.  Commentators have long 
raised questions about this claim, though lately some scholarly voices have 
sought to defend the idea of expertise by noting that laypeople have a tendency 
not to make sound judgments about risk.95  Still, there is something unsatisfying 
about the narrow claim that the heavy lifting done by the administrative state 
when it regulates is predominantly about expertise. Let me illustrate this first 
with Section 314, and then with examples from other regulatory contexts.
Specifically, privacy and related concerns – like many other issues 
entrusted to regulators – turn out not to be pure technical matters under almost 
any defensible definition. Even if one assumed that the law enforcement interest 
at issue in the Section 314 regulations should be treated as the exclusive domain 
of experts (a questionable assumption), there is almost no way of describing 
privacy concerns as the exclusive domain for experts.  It is true that the statute 
clearly emphasizes the goal of encouraging the sharing of information about 
suspected terrorists or money launderers, yet the statute also commands that 
sharing should be limited.  Both the nature of that limit, the rest of the USAPA 
statute, and the underlying APA notice-and-comment process suggest that the 
agency is supposed to strike a balance between several different issues.96   One 
94 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 403 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the impact of partisan 
changes on the administration of agency programs)(hereinafter “State Farm”).
95 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note___, at ___.
96 Cf. Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene) 448 U.S. 607,
646-48 (1980) (plurality opinion) (OSHA statute, if interpreted appropriately to cure 
constitutional defects, creates a list of factors that the agency must consider in creating a 
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goal, obviously, is advancing national security and law enforcement objectives.  
Treating this as a matter for experts to resolve is certainly plausible, though not 
obviously right.97  And whatever one thinks of the idea that national security and 
law enforcement can be treated as ripe for technical resolution by experts, the 
remaining concerns implicit in the statute are about privacy and accountability 
for the use of sensitive information.98  Presumably, this is why there are some 
restrictions on the use of the financial information by the government and 
financial institutions. 
Some might argue that any concern involved in regulatory policy reduces 
to a question of risks of particular states of the world.  Seen in this light, the 
concern over privacy evinced by Section 314 is nothing more than an awareness 
of the risk that the government will abuse its access to financial information.  
This way of thinking again turns all of regulatory policy into the anodyne task 
for a technocratic expert.  It is true that any policy question might in principle 
reduce to a matter of expected utility, but it is not clear how this cuts.  Agency 
officials have to think about expected utility when they make decisions, and so 
does everyone else.  But expected utility is about the value assigned to a state of 
regulation that is not arbitrary and capricious). (emphasizing the importance of the agency 
balancing several competing concerns).
97
 The question is in part whether people likely to be called on as experts in the field (i.e., law 
enforcers) are in a position to provide accurate information about what legal changes are needed.  
This raises at least two different kinds of problems.  One is the quality of information and 
analysis that experts on national security and law enforcement can provide.  Another is an agency 
problem: given that law enforcers, like anyone else, have interests and respond to incentives, 
there may be distoritions created when they serve both as experts and also beneficiaries of 
particular legal changes.  See Cuéllar, supra note 27.
98 For example, one commenter had the following to say:
I oppose all regulations of the Patriot Act proposed by the Treasury Department.  This 
act will do nothing to prevent terrorism and will only result in further losses of freedom 
and privacy for honest, law-abiding Americans.  The proposed Act is unconstitutional; 
the Administration and Congress will be violating their oaths to uphold the US 
Constitution if they agree to pass this or any similar legislation.  I hope my government 
still listens to its citizens and I have not wasted my time in stringently and in all ways 
OPPOSING THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION.  Thank you for doing what is highest 
and best for all Americans.
Section 314 Comments, supra note___, Comment # 124.  Another said this:
Banks already ignore the Privacy Act and illegally discriminate against people who do 
not use a Slave Surveillance Number (SSN)[sic].  I am opposed to your so-called 
“Patriot Act” and any other police state tactics you dream up.
Id., Comment # 63.  The Appendix, supra, lists excerpts from additional comments.
This is a far cry from a sophisticated argument to the effect that the agency should minimize the 
damage done by Miller by narrowing the scope of law enforcement authority.  But the preceding 
commenters would probably agree with the existing statement if given an explanation (and if she 
did not believe that all was lost in any event).
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the world, not just its probability.  If a citizen chose to be concerned about the 
Section 314 regulations and an agency official was not concerned, their 
difference of opinion may have nothing to do with their different estimates of the 
probability of abuse, but from a different guess about the cost they would bear if 
100 people knew that the citizen was sending money to a drug treatment center.  
Moreover, even if the citizen and the agency official began with the same 
valuation of the scenario, the government official might be desensitized from 
repeatedly being exposed to private information.99
The regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan100 provide another example of 
how there is much more to the administrative state than scientific technocracy.  
The question was whether – and how – the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services could apply a gag rule limiting abortion-related counseling in 
federally-funded clinics.  While the court made some moves in the direction of 
acknowledging ideological differences in how a Republican administration 
would treat the issue, the major thrust of the argument for deference to the 
agency was expertise and reference to “reasoned analysis”:
At no time did Congress directly address the issues of abortion 
counseling, referral, or advocacy.  The parties’ attempts to characterize 
highly generalized, conflicting statements in the legislative history into 
accurate revelations of congressional intent are unavailing.  When we 
find, as we do here, that the legislative history is ambiguous and 
unenlightening on the matters with respect to which the regulations deal, 
we customarily defer to the expertise of the agency.101
Technical and scientific knowledge probably matters some to this decision.  But 
only the most expansive definition of expert would let one just call the decision 
“science.”102
99 One could think of the existing administrative process and all its political checks as a way to 
address the regulatory issues that should not be left to the experts.  But, as Section 314 also 
makes clear, not every commenter with a morsel of information about the regulation’s policy 
implications manages to provide sophisticated input.  Not only does this lack of sophistication 
make it harder for a willing agency to assimilate contributions from many members of the public 
who do take the trouble to provide their comments.  A teeming mass of unsophisticated 
comments is also likely to reinforce the idea that nothing will happen if the agency ignores the 
comments from laypeople.
100
 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
101
 500 U.S. at 185-86. 
102
 And the bigger the concept of expertise, the more it makes sense to remember James Q. 
Wilson’s admonition about it.  In discussing the politics of bureaucracy, Wilson wrote:
What the statute left vague “experts” were to imbue with meaning.  But expert opinion 
changes and some experts in fact are politicians who bow to the influence of organized 
interests or ideologues who embrace the enthusiasms of zealous factions.
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Even the rarefied domain of environmental regulation involves, at best, 
a mix of scientific and policy determinations.  Consider the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s recent rules governing the concentration of arsenic in 
drinking water promulgated under the Safe Drinking Water Act.103  One study 
critiqued the final rule, alleging that the regulator was insufficiently attentive to 
technical economic and scientific concerns.104  Another scholarly commentator 
defended the rule, suggesting it was not the product of shoddy analysis but 
instead the result of legitimate judgment calls.105  According to this commentator, 
the agency issued a reasonable rule reflecting a legitimate interpretation of 
conflicting data from wage-premium studies106 and attention to the need for an 
adequate margin of safety.107  It is a separate question to ask whether the larger 
public would care or understand the debate between the two positions described 
above – a question I take up below – but the disagreement is obviously not just 
about science.  It is about the type of inference to draw from an imperfect wage-
premium study, and even more so about whether there is a need for an adequate 
margin of safety in a regulation designed to reduce a potentially dangerous 
concentration of arsenic.108
I could go on, but the point should be clear.  Of course agencies are 
expected to use rigorous analytical tools to weigh the risk of environmental, 
health-related, security, or occupational risks, depending on their mandate.  What 
such analysis depends on are questions such as how to interpret an ambiguous 
WILSON, supra note 43, at 330.
103
 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000). 
104 See Jason K. Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, EPA’s Arsenic Rule: The Benefits of the Standard 
Do Not Justify the Costs (2001), avail. at http://aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/ reg_analysis_ 
01_02.pdf.
105 See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002).
106 Id. at 2355.  Professor McGarity writes:
[It is] certainly correct to emphasize that existing wage premium studies produce a very 
wide distribution of estimates and that they surely do not encompass every 
consideration that should go into monetizing the value of a statistical life.  Whether 
these problems are cured [as the Burnett and Hahn study implies] by picking a number 
in the middle of the range of peer reviewed studies, multiplying that number by four 
because another law professor thought that was a sensible way to account for a few of 
the neglected considerations, and boosting that number by an additional twenty-three 
percent because rich people assign a higher monetary value to their lives than modest 
wage earners do is certainly an open question.
107 Id. at 2375.  The article notes:
How many of us want to drive over a bridge or ride in an airplane for which the last 
dollar spent on safety just equaled the projected monetized lives saved discounted to 
present value?  A margin of safety provides a backup level of safety as a hedge against 
catastrophe when experts turn out to be wrong.
108
 I am not suggesting that one can dispense with expert decisionmaking in determining (a) 
exactly what amounts to a “dangerous concentration” of arsenic, (b) 
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statute (not just ambiguous facts), or how to make judgment calls about the 
value of particular outcomes (not just their probability).  Unless one defines 
technical expertise or science in a way that explicitly includes political 
judgments, it is not plausible to treat all regulatory policy issues as being 
primarily about expert or scientific decisionmaking. Obviously expert 
decisionmaking has a role sculpting regulations about domestic security and 
financial privacy.  And sometimes statutes appear to call almost exclusively for 
scientific and technical determinations.109  Regulatory policy aims to affect 
complicated problems that are often not easily understood or explained.  But the 
administrative pluralism model seems to confuse two ideas.  One is that 
regulatory decisions are primarily about expert judgment.  The other is that view 
that most regulatory decisions involve contestable legal interpretations and 
policy judgments, both of which should be informed by technical and scientific 
expertise.  There is a difference.  In one approach the experts are assumed to be 
the ideal decisionmakers, and the rest of the regulatory process is meant only to 
assure they do not run amok with the public trust.  In the other approach the 
experts are viewed as being in a secondary, albeit valuable, role.110  Amidst the 
administrative pluralism model of public engagement and the nondelegation 
doctrine’s implicit focus on technical and scientific expertise, something gets 
lost in the shuffle.  What gets lost is the idea that statutory interpretation in the 
course of writing regulations involves value choices as much as technical and 
scientific knowledge.   
ii. Do interested parties provide sophisticated comments covering the 
major issues in a rulemaking proceeding?
The administrative pluralism strand would seem more satisfying if it 
turns out that clusters of interested parties gather round an agency during a 
difficult rulemaking proceeding to help it seriously consider a broad range of 
viewpoints when making regulatory policy decisions.  The implication of this 
image is that interested parties who submit comments and play a role in shaping 
regulatory policy will represent an array of concerns, including those that would 
likely be important to various different constituencies subject to the regulation.   
But this was not the case with the Section 314 regulations.  Not a single 
organized interest group concerned about privacy or civil liberties participated in 
the notice-and-comment process.111
109 See, e.g., See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) 
(hereinafter “American Trucking”) (interpreting the Clean Air Act to require exclusively a 
technical determination of what constitutes an adequate air quality standard to protect “public 
health”).
110
 Thus, adherents to the second approach are not surprised to find that agency administrators are 
rarely apolitical technical experts. 
111
 Neither is there any evidence to indicate that such groups participated through ex parte 
communications with the agency outside the context of the notice-and-comment process.  The 
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It would be hard to argue that privacy was irrelevant to what the agency 
was doing with Section 314.  Few people would be indifferent if unauthorized 
third parties had access to their private financial information.  Thanks to Section 
314 and the attendant regulations, what had been difficult for the government to 
obtain became relatively easy to get.  Despite the fact that privacy is important 
both as a legal and a policy matter, there was no participation from any mass 
membership or advocacy organization with a sophisticated capacity for legal 
capacity and concerned specifically about privacy.  Perhaps it is not surprising 
that such organizations may have too few resources to participate in rulemaking 
proceedings like this in times of crisis, when the pace of legal change quickens.112
Whatever the cause, there were no sophisticated interest groups urging the 
agency to weigh the purported benefits of Section 314 against the perceived or 
actual privacy costs.
Of course it is true that we may not be able to generalize the Section 314 
example to every situation.  Interest groups and mass membership organizations 
representing a broad array of viewpoints often take part in regulatory 
proceedings through comments or ex parte contacts with regulatory agencies.  
Nonetheless, a substantial percentage of rules do not generate any comments at 
all,113 and many interest groups consider participation in rulemaking less 
important than litigation, or making political contributions.114 The experience 
with Section 314 shows that this process cannot guarantee that sophisticated 
advocates will articulate the full range of concerns that someone might 
defensibly consider important.115  The larger question is what it means for the 
agency did not mention any such consultations in its discussion of the proposed or the final rule 
in the Federal Register, nor did it discuss the underlying (privacy and civil liberties) concerns 
that such groups would have presumably raised.
112
 If Section 314 regulations were being crafted at a time of meager legal changes affecting 
privacy or civil liberties, it is quite likely that the usual suspects – organizations like the 
American Civil Liberties Union or the Electronic Frontier Foundation – would have commented.
113 See Kerwin, supra note ___, at 185 (evaluating a sample of rules issued between January and 
June 1991, and finding that only about 60% of rules with prior notice generated any public 
comments).
114 Id. at 187 (62% of interest groups surveyed consider political contributions somewhat or far 
more important than participation in rulemaking, and 60% reach the same conclusion about 
litigation), and 194 (only 53% of groups surveyed “always” use written comments to influence 
the regulatory process).  One might interpret this as a “market” response of interest groups 
choosing to allocate their resources elsewhere.  Cf.  John M. de Figueiredo and Rui J. P. de 
Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and 
Administrative Regulation, unpublished paper on file with author (2002).  But interest groups 
may have their own reasons to focus their resources away from influencing policy – and these 
may not match the interests of the members.  See Moe, supra note___, at ___ (“…interest 
group… policymaking processes can only be understood by taking into account the close 
interconnection of internal politics and the structural determinations of formation and 
maintenance.”).
115
 The evidence here is not enough to establish whether the interest group process yields such 
systematic failures in other contexts.  But neither can we reliably conclude that Section 314 is a 
complete aberration. 
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interests of leaders of advocacy groups to be aligned with those of their 
members, or even more broadly, with those of the various “publics” that they are 
taken to represent.
 iii.  Do laypeople participate in regulatory proceedings?
Although the administrative pluralism approach plays down the 
possibility that masses of individual laypeople would be rushing to write in 
comments about proposed rules, their participation might still be quite valuable 
under the model.  In principle, individual citizens or members of informal 
associations could help cover any concerns not addressed by interest groups.
But do such people participate? 
It turns out that 172 comments about Section 314 were received, and over 
70% of those came from laypeople or unofficial organizations.  But before 
turning to the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding, consider the evidence from a 
number of different rulemaking proceedings.  Figure 1 reports the number of 
comments received in six different rulemaking proceedings. Because the extent 
of participation across issues can be so dramatically disparate, I use a 
logarithmic scale to compare the total amount of participation.  A two-fold 
increase along the chart’s horizontal axis represents a ten-fold increase in the 
number of comments.  The first bar corresponds to the Section 314 rulemaking 
described above.116  The next bar reports on participation in the various 
regulations that the Federal Election Commission recently issued to implement 
the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, popularly known as the “McCain-
Feingold” law.117  The third bar reports on comments received by the September 
11 Victim Compensation Fund at the Department of Justice in connection with 
its rulemaking proceeding.118  The fourth bar indicates the number of comments 
received by the Environmental Protection Agency in connection with the 
116 See Appendix for a discussion of the source.
117
 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. (1998).  The total 
comments listed reflect all the comments received on regulations implementing the new 
campaign finance reform law, including (1) 1116 comments on public financing of presidential 
candidates and conventions, see 68 Fed. Reg. 47386; (2) 4 comments on consolidated reporting 
requirements, see 68 Fed. Reg. 404; (3) 51 comments on coordinated and independent 
expenditures, see 68 Fed. Reg. 421, (4) 13 comments on misuse of campaign funds and related 
issues, see 67 Fed. Reg. 76962; (5) 25 comments on contribution limits, see 67 Fed. Reg. 69928; 
(6) only 47 comments on regulations implementing the “electioneering communication” 
provisions that appear to have important free speech implications, see 67 Fed. Reg. 65190; (7) 5 
comments on the administrative reorganization of regulations on “contribution” and 
“expenditure”, see http://www.fec.gov/register.htm; and (8) 2 comments on the extent of 
administrative fines, see 68 Fed. Reg. 12572.
118
 These include 806 comments received in response to the initial notice of inquiry, 2687 
comments specifically on the interim final rule, and 628 comments on the regulation received 
after the deadline.  Jonathan D. Melber, An Act of Discretion: Rebutting Cantor Fitzgerald’s 
Critique of the Victim Compensation Fund, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749, 750-55 (2003).
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National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone in 
1997.119  The fifth bar indicates the number of comments recently received by the 
Federal Communications Commission in the course of recent rulemaking 
proceedings changing local media ownership restrictions.120  The final bar shows 
the number of comments received on the Food and Drug Administration’s 
regulations on cigarette sale and distribution to minors.121
What the figure shows is that at least some rulemaking proceedings seem 
to attract mass participation.  The specific rates of participation vary between 
172 in the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding to approximately 700,000 for the 
FDA regulations involving the sale of cigarettes to minors.  Admittedly, 
comment periods vary and many of these comments may reflect organized letter-
writing efforts by interest groups.  Nonetheless, the scale of participation in 
some rulemaking proceedings belies simple explanations suggesting that only 
parties with a narrow economic stake (or something like it) would participate. 
Witness the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund.  Though only a small 
number of individuals would be eligible for benefits, the agency received 50 
times as many comments as were received about Section 314 – a regulation 
affecting, in principle, everyone in the country.122  The scale of participation on 
the media control and cigarette sale regulations at least hints at the possibility 
that larger chunks of the public might become quite interested in regulatory 
policy.  Even if many of these comments came from members of interest groups, 
those groups must still find ways of motivating a mass membership to send in 
comments.  This suggests that given the right alignment of political 
circumstances, media attention, and institutional factors, hundreds of thousands 
of citizens might take the time to express their views about regulatory policy.
119 See 62 Fed. Reg. 38652; 62 Fed. Reg. 38856, 38858.
120 See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2002 Biennial Regulatory 
Review–Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted 
Pursuant to Section 202 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, FCC 03-127, 5 (2003), avail. at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A1.pdf.  
121 See Rules and Regulations: Department of health and Human Services, Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children 
and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44417.
122
 It would be hard to argue that the rates of participation somehow reflect the “importance” of 
the regulation.  Participation is probably driven by a host of factors, including media attention to 
the regulatory issue involved, the issue’s inherent salience, and the organizational efforts of 
interest groups.  This foreshadows an important theme to which I return later: members of the 
public may have one reaction  if they consider an issue superficially and another if they reflect on 
it.  This is true not only in the decision to allocate scarce resources to participate in one 
rulemaking (say, the Victim Compensation Fund regulation) as opposed to another (say, Section 
314), but in what they think of on the merits.  Just as it is important to understand how the 
political context might affect individuals’ judgments on the merits (which I discuss below), we 
must learn more about what drives citizens’ initial impressions of what issue is worth 
commenting on in the first place.  See Part III.b.
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1.  DIFFERENT RATES OF PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING 
PROCEEDINGS123
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5 0 0 00 0
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100 0 0
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1 00 0
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1 00
5 0
7 0 00 0 0
5 0 00 0 0
5 0 00 0
4 12 1
12 6 3
1 7 2
Given the tiny number of comments received about Section 314 
compared to, say, the number of comments on the FDA cigarette sale 
regulations, one might imagine the commenters on Section 314 were probably 
just organized interests with an economic agenda.  Not so.  In fact the experience 
with Section 314 shows that laypeople participated in greater numbers than any 
other kind of participants.  This is striking in some ways.  The vast majority of 
commenters were not members of organized interest groups or businesses, but 
ordinary laypeople or representatives of unofficial local associations such as the 
self-styled “San Jacinto Constitutional Study Group.”   Thus participation seems 
skewed towards individuals.  Yet while most of these individuals raise a 
recurrent and clearly identifiable concern – privacy – they submit comments that 
are tremendously unsophisticated.  
A substantial majority of comments – over 70% -- came from individuals 
with no stated organizational affiliation.  None of these comments appeared to be 
form letters.  This is not what would be expected from much of the literature on 
who is concerned about regulatory policy.124  Conversely FinCEN did not receive 
a single comment from general membership not-for-profit organizations that 
123
 Several sources provided these figures.  See notes 63-68, supra for the sources. Rates of 
participation for the air quality, media control, and cigarette sale to minors regulations are 
approximate figures reported in the Federal Register.
124 See generally David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, 
and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 697 (1994).
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could have added a relevant perspective to the regulatory process here.  Figure 
1 shows the breakdown.
2.  OVERALL BREAKDOWN OF COMMENTS BY CATEGORY
7 2 .1%
1 .2 %
1 2 .8%
1 4 .0%
In divid ua l
Unofficia l g rou p
Org  rep . bu s in ess
Bus in es s
 
Different commenters showed radically different concerns about the 
regulation.  As Figure 3 indicates below, individual commenters 
disproportionately mentioned privacy concerns.  Businesses and organizations 
representing them tended to raise multiple concerns, but only rarely did they 
address privacy.
3.  COMPARISON OF ISSUES MENTIONED BY COMMENT TYPE
RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
40
Comme nter id en tit y (i. e.,  individu al, gr oup, and  so on)
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2 .5
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T echn ica l d rafting
Privacy
While the majority of the comments came from individuals – and the vast 
majority of such comments focused on concerns about privacy -- these 
comments proved to be tremendously unsophisticated.  The appendix discusses 
how I evaluated the sophistication of the comments.  Figure 3 shows a 
comparison of the sophistication of the different commenter types.  Few of them 
recognized the distinction between the regulation and the statute, and only a 
meager number offered anything remotely resembling a concrete proposal. 
Instead, individual commenters came across as being angry and exasperated at 
what they viewed as unjustified changes in government’s access to private 
financial information.  The following is a typical comment. 
Privacy is a Constitutional right, why should we the people have any 
more rights removed.  This act means the terrorist [sic] win.  You have 
all the necessary instruments in place to follow the terrorist actions 
now.
125
125
 Section 314 Comments, supra note ___, comment # 45.  The commenter continues:
This is still one nation under God.  How about we do t his, how about we repent and get 
some super help from him.  I guarantee you he knows exactly who’s guilty and whose 
[sic] innocent and where they are.
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So while the individual comments raised concerns about privacy and 
government accountability, there was no mention of providing sunsets for the 
regulation, building in reporting mechanisms to oversee the law enforcement 
agencies making the information requests, or providing remedies to people 
whose records turned out to be improperly obtained or used. 
4.  COMPARING SOPHISTICATION, LENGTH, AND IMPACT BY COMMENT 
TYPE
Commenter ident it y ( i.e., individual, group, and so on)
Business group/ rep.
Business
Unof f . org.
Individual
5
4
3
2
1
0
T ot al sophist icat ion
Lengt h of comment
( pages or f ract ions)
Comment  impact
( changes adopt ed)
iv. What does an agency do with the comments it receives?
I have argued that it is hard to dismiss the privacy concerns as being 
irrelevant, either to the statutory scheme or in principle.  The question then arises 
whether the disproportionately unsophisticated comments made by laypeople 
concerned about privacy led to some kind of change in the regulation.  They did 
not.  In fact, the changes made in the regulation appeared to respond exclusively 
to comments that came in from the private sector.  
On the one hand, since the bulk of the comments raised a concern about 
privacy one might expect that this would affect the resulting regulations – or at  
least the agency’s response to the comments in the Federal Register.  On the 
other hand, as Figure 4 also shows, the disproportionate concentration of 
sophistication among the comments from businesses and organizations 
representing them might suggest that these would be the comments that 
influence the agency’s response.  One might also think that financial institutions 
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and the organizations representing them would have a disproportionate impact 
because of their greater concentration of political power.126
The fact is there were no changes in the regulation to address the privacy 
concerns brought up by the vast majority of commenters. The resulting 
regulations do not include, for example, a sunset provision, nor do they create a 
remedy for violations of the certification requirement, or any other mechanism to 
address the privacy concerns raised by the vast majority of commenters.  
Predictably enough, sophistication and status as a business or organization 
representing business yield a strong prediction of whether the agency 
implemented a requested change.127  The striking relationship is obvious in 
Figure 5, which plots each comment’s adjusted sophistication (defined as the 
product of the qualitative sophistication grade times the number of pages) 
against the comment’s impact, as measured by the number of suggestions 
actually adopted made in any given comment.128
The table that follows reports the results of an ordinary least squares
regression predicting a comment’s impact (measured by the number of issues 
raised in the comment that the agency addressed in its revised regulation) from 
its sophistication and whether or not the comment came from some private 
sector entity.129  The first regression (reported in the left column) reports the 
result of a regression including all the comments.  The second regression 
(reported in the right column) describes a regression on just the comments 
coming from business or its representatives.  Sophistication and commenter 
status (as a business or its representative) both have coefficients with positive 
signs.130  The second regression shows that – even among the comments from 
126 Cf. Olson, supra note ___, at ___.  See also James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation in 
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357 (J.Q. Wilson, ed. 1980)
127
 There does not appear to be a significant multicollinearity problem.  See D. Gujarati, Basic 
Econometrics 319 (1995).  In the multivariate OLS regressions reported in Table 5, the ratios of 
the maximum and minimum eigenvalues are under 100.  See id. at 338.  Klein’s rule of thumb 
suggests that multicollinearity may be a troublesome problem only if the R2 obtained from 
auxiliary regressions of the independent variables in the equations are greater than the overall R2.  
See L.R. KLEIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 101(1962).  That is not the case here (the 
R2 for an auxiliary regression of adjusted sophistication and whether commenter is a business or 
its representative is .46). 
128
 The Appendix describes the details of how I coded for length and qualitative sophistication.  I 
checked for robustness by examining the effect of qualitative sophistication by itself.  The results 
were not materially different.
129
 OLS regression is appropriate here because the dependent variable is continuous (i.e., number 
of issues raised in the comment that the agency actually addressed in its revised regulations).  To 
check for robustness I also used a logistic regression (logit) model, where the dependent variable 
was whether the agency’s final regulations had addressed any issue that the comment raised.  The 
results were not materially different.
130
 Although statistical significance is not directly relevant because the figures reflect the result of 
a population, not a sample, regression function, the coefficients for the dependent variables 
would have been statistically significant if the data reflected a sample.
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businesses and their representatives – sophistication still seems to affect the 
extent to which the agency addresses concerns raised in the comments.
5. SOPHISTICATION AND COMMENT IMPACT, BROKEN DOWN BY 
COMMENTER TYPE
Is  comm ent e r a bus ine ss  or its  rep.  (0= n o, 1= yes)
1 .0 0
1 .0 0
.0 0
.0 0
. 0 0
.0 0
. 0 0
.0 0
. 0 0
6 0
5 0
4 0
3 0
2 0
1 0
0
Ad j.  so ph ist ica t io n
Co mmen t im p act
6 . P RE DI CT I NG  “ CO MME NT  I MP ACT ”  B Y CO MME NT  T YP E  
AND S O P H I S T I CA T IO N
F o r  A l l  
C o m m e n t s
F o r  C o m m e n t s  
F r o m  Bu s i n e s se s  o r  
t h e i r  
R e p r e se n t a t i v e s  
D e p e n d e n t  
V a r ia b l e :  
Co m m e n t  I m p a c t
D e p e n d e n t  Va r ia b l e :
Co m m e n t  I m p a c t
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Constant
     Unstandardized 
        coefficient
(Standard error)
.0001
(.043)
1.067
Adjusted 
Sophistication
      Unstandardized
         coefficient
       Standardized
         coefficient
       (Standard error)
.0493
.472
       (.005)
.0492
.584
(.01)
Commenter Type 
(i.e., Commenter 
is a Business or 
Its 
Representative)
      Unstandardized
    coefficient
       Standardized
         coefficient
(Standard error)
1.065
.481
(.113)
--
--
--
R-squared .763 .341
Adjusted R-squared .761 .326
F Statistic for the 
Regression
270.9 22.76
Table reports unstandardized OLS multiple regression coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard errors in parentheses.  
It makes sense to expect that the commenters’ political and economic 
power drives the agency’s differential response to the comments.  There is a 
substantial literature on this in political science,131 and there are certainly 
substantial theory-related grounds to believe that agencies would be sensitive not 
only to litigation risk but also to interest groups’ political responses to an 
undesired regulation.  Yet the data provide at least some reasons to believe that 
agency responses here might be driven not only by differences in political power 
but also by differences in sophistication.  If one examines only the comments 
from businesses and organizations representing them, there is still a strong 
relationship between adjusted sophistication and agency responsiveness to the 
comment.
131 See generally E.E. Schattschneider, The Scope and Bias of the Pressure System, in CLASSIC 
READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom, eds. 1990).
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Admittedly, these data do not include controls for the potential political 
or economic influence of businesses or organizations commenting.132  Neither 
can we tell how much back-channel lobbying businesses or their representatives 
conducted with the agency (though there are some legal limits on this).133  Yet 
individuals and unofficial organizations tend to have far less political power than 
businesses and organizations representing them, so the fact that a comment 
comes from one of these entities can serve as a proxy for political power – and it 
is not altogether obvious that, once we screen out individuals and unofficial 
organizations, sophistication would correlate highly with political power.134
Some people might argue that the inclusion of default rules limiting the 
scope of searches could be a partial reaction to concerns about privacy.  Perhaps 
– but even the agency did not characterize this change in those terms, focusing 
instead on its administrative cost benefit to financial institutions.135 Moreover, 
regardless of whether the default rules are a step in the right direction from the 
privacy perspective, no other aspect of the regulation even remotely addresses 
such concerns.  The certification requirement seems to follow in a 
straightforward way from the language of the statute, not from some concern 
about privacy (and in any case, there is basically no remedy for a violation of it).  
And broadening the definition of financial institutions eligible for the safe harbor 
seems to cut against privacy concerns.
Regarding the agency’s written response to the comments, what is still 
more striking is that the agency did not even bother to discuss privacy concerns 
(except perhaps in the most oblique way) in its Federal Register response 
including the final regulation.  Under existing law agencies get some leeway in 
deciding how to group categories of comments for the purpose of responding to 
their arguments;136 presumably what keeps them from using this flexibility to 
ignore whole categories of comments is the threat of litigation.  If the agency 
largely ignored the mass of comments raising privacy concerns, the reason may 
132
 Nor does it necessarily make sense to use status as a single business versus status as an 
organization as a proxy for political influence.  For example, a single business commenting (such 
as Wells Fargo Bank) might plausibly have more power than some organizations (such as the 
National Association of Credit Unions).  In any case, status as an organization representing 
business is not statistically-significant in a regression predicting comment impact by adjusted 
sophistication and status as an organization (for status as organization, t=-.938, and p=.353).
133 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(although blanket limitations on 
ex parte contacts only suitable for regulatory proceedings similar to adjudication or formal 
rulemaking, agency must place in rulemaking record an adequate summary of all post-comment 
conversations and meetings that were of “central relevance” to the rulemaking).  Agencies also 
promulgate regulations limiting the scope of their ex parte contacts.  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.7 
(FTC rules limiting ex parte contact in the course of informal rulemaking); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1201-
13 (FCC rules).
134
 Indeed, the opposite hypothesis is also plausible: if sophisticated persuasive appeals and 
political influence are substitutes, then more power might make it less important to make a 
complex, lawyerly appeal for a chance in the regulations.  
135 See Section 314 Final Rule Statement, supra note ___, at 60583.
136 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 409.
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be both the relative lack of sophistication in the comments as well as the dim 
prospects that members of the San Jacinto Constitutional Study Group (or any 
one of the other commenters, for that matter) would litigate if they were ignored.  
The underlying statute may explicitly restrict the factors that an agency can 
consider in making regulations.137  That’s not the case here. If anything, the 
statute evinces some concern about privacy through its explicit concern with 
restricting the scope of increased sharing of information to situations where there 
is reasonable suspicion of money laundering or terrorism.138
Notice that none of my observations here disparage the hard work of the 
regulatory staff in responding to comments and crafting the regulations.  The 
staff of a regulatory agency, like anyone else, responds to the available legal 
tools and the incentives shaping their environment.  Thus the agency tracked the 
comments submitted on Section 314 and responded to those it considered 
relevant and significant.  It made changes in the regulation in response to some 
comments.  And yet in the end, a substantial majority of the comments went 
largely excluded.    
C. Administrative Pluralism’s Empirical Presuppositions Are Questionable
In the end, the administrative pluralism model seems supported by 
certain realities of the administrative state, but not by others. Notice and 
comment rulemaking, subject to judicial review, probably serves as some sort of 
constraint on agencies.  FinCEN responded to many of the categories of 
comments regarding Section 314, and so lived up to its responsibilities under 
existing law.139  This is worth something.   Moreover, legislative and presidential 
control does matter.  Studies using various kinds of methodologies clearly show 
137 See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.
138
 The agency obviously has some discretion in making sense of these requirements, but that’s 
not a convincing reason for it to ignore the privacy-related comments.  Let me elaborate.  Even if 
the agency argued that Chevron deference entitled it to interpret the statute so that privacy 
concerns were excluded, such a move does not extinguish its responsibility to consider 
significant arguments about the regulation.  Otherwise it would hardly make sense for the court 
to have decided in Mead that the agency could not automatically Chevron deference, and that the 
opportunity for public comment available through notice-and-comment rulemaking was a factor 
militating in favor of deference.  See Mead, _____The agency’s choice of interpretation is, after 
all, an important decision – particularly if its implication is to exclude the importance of concerns 
raised by the bulk of commenters on the statute. To dismiss the significance of the privacy-
related public comments on statutory grounds implies that unless the statute specifically 
commands the agency to consider privacy, the agency can choose not to do so.  That does not 
follow from American Trucking, nor does it follow from the rest of the legal structure of 
administrative law.  Sometimes the statute does not explicitly list the factors the agency should 
consider in issuing regulations, even if it does provide a bound on the scope of agency discretion 
that is sufficient to survive whatever remains of the nondelegation doctrine.  
139 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at ___.
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that the political context matters.140  The president’s appointees shape the 
agency’s work,141 and even after that the executive retains a measure of residual 
decisionmaking authority to influence the legislative process.142  One should be 
wary of idealizing representative politics.  It is heavily influenced by organized 
interest group activity.143  Still, voters can use heuristics to make decisions about 
candidates and parties that have at least an indirect impact on politicians, who in 
turn can affect regulation.144
In short, the experience with Section 314 and other regulations shows 
how the reality of the existing approach to public engagement is consistent with 
much of the positive theory behind administrative pluralism.  That same 
experience raises questions, though, about its prescriptive ideas.  (1) On 
expertise, the administrative pluralism model confounds two ideas: one is the 
importance of expert judgment for some (perhaps even many) regulatory issues, 
and the other is the claim that expert judgment is the core activity of all 
regulatory policymaking.  (2) Even leaving aside the problem that interest group 
strength is lopsided for a lot of issues, the experience with Section 314 makes it 
hard to believe the milder conjecture that, at least, different sorts of interest 
groups will participate in rulemaking proceedings, covering all the normatively 
important issues with sophisticated arguments for the agency to consider.145  (3) 
The administrative pluralism model does not expect members of the public to 
participate, yet many did so here.  It is true that they seemed disproportionately 
unsophisticated and concerned about a single issue – but this may be a reason to 
140 See generally Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked:  Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 164 (1984); Barry R. 
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?  Regulatory 
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Barry R. 
Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System:  A Principal-Agent Perspective (With 
Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984).
141 See, e.g., Am. Iron and Steel Inst. V. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999)(“Logic 
dictates that an agency must have some discretion in setting an agenda for rulemaking and 
excluding some matters categorically.”).  See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2343 (2001).
142 See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POLI. 
SCI. 197, 220-22 (1982).
143 See Schattschneider, supra note 131, at ____. 
144 See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN 
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998) (emphasizing the role of candidate 
reputation in voters’ reasoned decisions about representative politics); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE 
REASONING VOTER:  COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991) 
(emphasizing the role of retrospective evaluations and candidate evaluations to argue that voters’ 
choices in presidential elections are “rational”).
145
 To believe this, one would have to believe that the concerns raised by the sophisticated 
commentators were the only important ones.  That’s hard to accept.  It may be this problem only 
arises in times of crisis – and perhaps then only for regulations involving national security and 
law enforcement.  If so, it’s still a serious problem.  But it’s not certain that for other regulatory 
matters, there will be sufficiently diverse interest group participation to make sure that various 
important aspects of an issue are discussed with sophistication.  
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ask whether disparities in sophistication can be remedied.  Others among the 
public may be both more sophisticated (at least when initially asked), and more 
willing to balance competing concerns – but they did not participate.  This is 
hardly surprising, given the relatively low likely returns of taking the time to 
write a comment as an individual.  (4) While the administrative pluralism model 
does not depend on or expect laypeople to participate, it does imply that the 
government should not ignore laypeople who do take the time to participate.  
The very fact of that participation is an indication of intensity of preference. Yet 
the comments of laypeople who participated were effectively ignored here.  In 
contrast, the comments from private sector interests and their representatives 
were discussed in detail by the agency, and many were able to directly influence 
the resulting regulation.  The more sophisticated commenters among businesses 
or their representatives tended to have even more of an impact.
There are those who will still cling onto administrative pluralism despite 
the lack of support for some of its empirical presuppositions.  The less one 
believes the empirical presuppositions I have critiqued, however, the more one 
has to rely exclusively on representative politics to legitimate what happens in 
the administrative state.  There’s obviously something to this: representative 
politicians have a lot of control over the administrative state.  As with any kind 
of theory of democracy, one might believe that our particular version of 
representative democracy leads to good (enough) decisions, or that it is fair 
enough to serve as a fount of procedural legitimacy.  If one believes that strongly 
in representative democracy, then decisions that emanate from representative 
politicians will be imbued with sufficient legitimacy.  The existing architecture 
for public engagement would then be rendered acceptable because it was built by 
representative politicians, and so too would it be just fine for legislators to 
simply decide not to interfere with the Section 314 regulations as they ended up.
This not an incoherent position, but it is not appealing.  There is no 
denying that the current structure of the administrative state is politically 
efficient, but it is a different thing altogether to say this makes it legitimate.   To 
equate the two is to buy into a pretty circular theory of legitimacy, unless one 
has a separate theory of how the interests of representative politicians are aligned 
with those of their constituents.  The electoral mechanism plays a major role, but 
one might question whether it consistently succeeds in aligning the relevant 
interests.  One can question this because of potential agency problems, and also 
because of limitations in how voters make decisions.  Voters may be able to use 
simple mental short-cuts to make broad, reasonable overall judgments about 
candidates and parties146 – but they can plainly make mistakes (when compared 
to what they would find important if they had more information and time to 
think about it) in deciding what are the most important issues on which they 
want to base their decisions.  Paternalism may not be the answer to these 
shortcomings of voters in the arena of representative politics.  Elected, 
146 See ARTHUR LUPIA AND MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA (1998).
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representative politicians designed the legal procedures of the administrative 
state and have the power to undo regulatory decisions at any point.  But the 
potential shortcomings of representative democracy should make one skeptical 
about the claim that public participation in regulatory decisions is irrelevant 
simply because of the power that politicians retain.
None of this would surprise advocates of participatory democracy, who 
have always been uneasy with the pluralist equation between descriptive theories 
of interest group control and normative ideas about what makes for good 
regulation.  Regardless of whether they questioned administrative pluralism’s 
empirical assumptions, people with an interest in participatory democracy seem 
to believe that pluralism takes an unnecessarily narrow approach to democracy –
one that relies too heavily on interest-group and representative politician elites, 
and that misses the larger value of involving the public in decisions shaping its 
life.  For believers in participatory democracy, there is something to be said for 
for the view that people should have an effect on the regulatory process even if 
they do not mobilize to comment – particularly when the regulations (as with 
Section 314) involve complex trade-offs and no obvious competition between 
organized, opposing interest groups.  Indeed, unless one has a theory of 
democracy where the failure to raise one’s voice automatically means one’s 
participation is unimportant, then one should be concerned about the interests of 
people who are affected in principle but do not participate in practice – either 
because they did not comment at all, or because they commented but their 
participation is not sophisticated enough for the agency to assimilate.147  In the 
Parts that follow, I develop this perspective further and discuss the feasibility of 
legal mechanisms to carry it out.
III.  
ADMINISTRATIVE PLURALISM TAKES A NARROW APPROACH TO PUBLIC 
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Any convincing evaluation of public engagement in the administrative 
state must recognize an observation amply developed in the context of voting 
rights scholarship and positive political theory: the “public will” does not exist in 
some pure, unadulterated form.  People’s views must be aggregated somehow, 
and it is the scheme chosen – whether some kind of direct democracy, voting in 
geographic districts, or the notice-and-comment process – that determines the 
147
 The data on participation in the Section 314 proceedings suggests that sophistication might 
have an effect on the agency’s acceptance of commenter recommendations even if one is 
considering only comments from businesses and organizations representing them.  Thus, even if 
one reason for the agency’s skewed response is the disproportionate political power of private 
sector participants, there is room to be concerned about whether commenters possess adequate 
sophistication.  
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content of the public’s will.148  This underscores the need to look beyond legal 
formalisms (i.e., whether there is a right to vote or a chance to comment on a 
rule) to understand the impact of a preference aggregation mechanism.149 At its 
148
 The preference-aggregation mechanism (or “institutions”) can impact the derivation of the 
public’s “will” in at least two different ways: most directly (and obviously), institutions 
determine how preferences are counted up.  See, e.g., Sam Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, 
Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry 
R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 
(1981). See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, AND RICHARD H. PILDES, 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2001).  But institutions can also shape how people develop 
preferences over time.  See, e.g. Cass R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 
(1997).  Sunstein aptly describes why taking preferences “as a given” seems to ignore the fact 
that preferences are always constructed according to the context:
[T]he initial allocation creates the basic ‘reference state’ from which values and 
judgments of fairness are subsequently made, and those judgments affect preferences 
and private willingness to pay.  Of course, a decision to make an entitlement alienable 
or inalienable (consider the right to vote or reproductive capacities) can have 
preference-shaping effects.  Because of the preference-shaping effects of the rules of 
allocation, it is difficult to see how a government might even attempt to take preferences 
‘as given’ or as the basis for decisions in any global sense.
149 If there were simply an unadulterated “public will” existing in the abstract, it would be easy to 
evaluate a preference aggregation scheme by comparing the result of the scheme to the 
preexisting public will.  But that is not possible.  Moreover, to the extent that some mechanism 
appears to get closer to this ideal through direct democracy, this does not necessarily make the 
resulting system “better.” A recent case highlights some of the possible drawbacks of simply 
incorporating a referendum into the administrative process. In 1995, the Buckeye Community 
Hope Foundation purchased land zoned for apartments in the City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio and 
set out to build Pleasant Meadows, an affordable housing complex.  See City of Cuhayoga Falls 
v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, avail. at 2003 WL 1477301 (2003). Using low-income 
tax credits, the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation (Buckeye) obtained financing, bought 
some land zoned for apartments – and then ran into a problem.  As the plan wound its way 
through the small city’s Planning Commission and City Council, a vocal group of city residents 
coalesced to oppose Pleasant Meadows. They complained to the Planning Commission, which 
imposed various conditions on the project, including that Buckeye build an earthen wall around 
the whole project.  Buckeye agreed, and the Planning Commission unanimously approved the 
project, recommending it to the City Council.  
The opponents of Pleasant Meadows were undaunted.  The City Council meetings 
scheduled to discuss Pleasant Meadows were anything but pleasant.  Cuyahoga Falls’ Mayor 
came to express his personal opposition to Pleasant Meadows.  So did angry residents, who 
voiced a number of concerns about the low-cost apartments: that the development would bring an 
influx of families with children, that the families who lived there would cause crime and drug 
activity to escalate, and (indeed) that it would attract a population similar to the one on Prange 
Drive, which happened to be Cuyahoga Falls’ only predominantly African American 
neighborhood.  None of this swayed the City Council, which approved the project in April 1996 
over the objections of the Mayor and a growing group of angry residents.  Twenty eight days 
after the Council approved Pleasant Meadows, its opponents filed a petition pursuant to local law 
requesting that the ordinance approving Pleasant Meadows be submitted to a popular vote, which 
the City allowed voters the “power to approve or reject at the polls any ordinance or resolution 
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core, the administrative pluralism approach to public engagement is a 
complicated mechanism for aggregating preferences.  The most important 
question about it is therefore not whether it provides a formal mechanism for 
people’s interests to be considered, but instead what particular vision of 
democracy is implicit in the administrative pluralism model when it comes time 
to decide what to do with those interests.
In this Part, I trace the argument that administrative pluralism’s 
underlying vision of democracy is unnecessarily constricted. The narrowness 
comes from the fact that administrative pluralism – and the existing approach to 
public engagement that it bolsters -- takes both the public’s interest in regulatory 
policy and its sophistication as fixed variables that cannot be changed.  This in 
turn creates a sort of self-fulfilling prophesy: direct democracy seems like an 
implausible and problematic alternative for shaping regulatory mandates based 
on statutes like Section 314, and yet the existing legal framework does nothing 
to convey the impression to members of the mass public (either individuals or in 
the aggregate) that their cognitive or emotional investments in getting to know 
the issues will have a payoff.  Which suggests that an intellectually honest 
version of administrative pluralism strand must now contend with the question 
that the participatory democracy strand has always faced: how much 
participation is enough, and what specific institutional mechanisms might 
accomplish this?  
A.  Collective Decisionmaking Constantly Poses the Question of Sufficiency of 
Participation
Unless we make unrealistic assumptions, any collective decisionmaking 
process will give some people more power than others.150  Thus, depending on 
passed by the Council” within 30 days of the ordinance’s passage). Cuyahoga Falls City Charger, 
Art. 9, § 2, App. 14.  The petition led to a referendum, in which voters decisively rejected the 
prospect of Pleasant Meadows.  
The use of the referendum here raises some potential problems.  A mass election did not 
appear to be the setting for participants to consider the long-term costs and benefits of building 
Pleasant Meadows.  If anything, the opposite happened: the facts suggest that the referendum 
drive was fueled in part by racial animus against the black voters who would be the likely 
beneficiaries of Pleasant Meadows.  Yet the nature of equal protection doctrine virtually 
eliminated Buckeye’s ability to challenge the referendum as a means of race discrimination 
because of the difficulty of proving intent from the voters participating. The Ohio Supreme Court 
eventually found the referendum invalid on the ground that the Ohio State Constitution 
authorizes referendums only in relation to legislative acts, not administrative acts, such as the 
site-plan ordinance.  As this article demonstrates, the rationale for such a distinction is not as 
strong as it seems.  Nonetheless, the problems with referenda remain.
150
 The literature on this topic is vast.  At its center is Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem, and 
the substantial literature critiquing it.  For an insightful introduction to the debates surrounding 
this result, see Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy; 
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 
(1990).
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the institutional details, collective decisions that supposedly depend on 
democratic procedures can still empower an oligarchy.  Procedures that are 
supposed to be explicitly democratic – such as local elections, legislative voting, 
or presidential contests – reflect dramatic differences in participation.  Not 
everyone legally entitled to be heard participates equally, and intensity of 
participation rarely matches the precise extent of the interests at stake.  Members 
of an organization do not always have enough time to get to know the slates for 
boards of directors.  Constituents of a local school district may not all vote in the 
local election.  The electorate for presidential elections may not take the time to 
discern the differences in positions between two candidates or make the effort to 
vote in the primary.  People face collective action problems.  Even where 
laypeople with a certain interest are represented by organized groups, these 
groups form intermittently, and solve collective action problems only 
imperfectly.  In short, differential rates of participation affect virtually all 
democratic decisionmaking procedures.  
What is more, such a skew in participation need not be a disaster.  We 
might still value collective decisionmaking procedures that make participation 
easier for some people than for others.  If people participate at different rates and 
with different intensity, perhaps this shows differences in the intensity of their 
underlying preference – which is certainly valuable information under certain 
conditions.  It would be costly, possibly unconstitutional, and perhaps 
unworkable to ensure that everyone participated to the same degree in a given 
collective decision.  And despite such limits, differences in a speaker’s 
articulateness or an audience’s receptivity would skew the impact of 
participation in any case.  Not only might we still value collective 
decisionmaking procedures that reflect or depend on differential rates of 
participation, but changing such differences in participation might entail various 
kinds of costs – ranging from administrative complexity to free speech 
restrictions.
Yet the distortions themselves are also costs, which emerge when we 
consider the most often-cited rationales for some kind of democratic 
decisionmaking.  For some observers, democratic collective decisions are 
valuable because they allow people who will be impacted by the decision to 
participate in making it.151  For others, democracy is valuable because it allows a 
majority of the relevant community to choose the best course of action in a 
public-spirited way after some kind of deliberation.152  For still others, the 
potential chaos and unpredictability of democracy is valuable because at least it 
151 See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 321 
(1997)(describing “procedural” theories of democracy that highlight the “inherent fairness or 
justice of its system of substantial and equal participation in legislation by the governed.”).
152 See, e.g., Bohman, supra note___, at ___ (discussing the inherent value of incorporating 
people who will be affected by a decision into the process of decisionmaking).  See also JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1995).
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provides information useful in policymaking that would not otherwise be 
available to government.153  All of these rationales are reminiscent of the 
participatory democracy strand of thought regarding public engagement in the 
administrative state.  They are undercut to some extent by distortions in 
participation.  The distortions introduce the possibility that people with a stake in 
the collective decision will simply not participate.  The distortions also make it 
harder to achieve any sort of majoritarian deliberation in the decision.  For 
example, suppose that voting in the election for Insurance Commissioner costs 
the average citizen goes from about $5 to about $7 in time and effort (perhaps 
because polling places are closed).  Suppose further that as a result of this 
change, 10% fewer citizens decide that it is worth their effort to take part in the 
election.  Even if the loss of that 10% of voters does not render the election 
illegitimate, the loss weakens the claim that the democratic, collective decision is 
legitimate because people affected participated.  The loss of voters also weakens 
the claim that the election reflects the result of some kind of desirable 
majoritarian deliberation.  Finally, the loss of the 10% of voters deprives the new 
insurance commissioner of information about (and much of the incentive to care) 
how some chunk of the electorate reacted to her candidacy.  
The formalistic answer to this quandary is to say something like this: 
“Look, whatever the electoral institutions require as a minimum rate of 
participation is enough!  Not everyone wants to participate in making decisions 
about Section 314 or the rules for elections or whatever, and not everyone should
be made to do so.”154  This answer of course begs part of the question because the 
minimum degree of participation is determined by law, and the law itself is the 
product of the democratic process.  Nonetheless, whatever one thinks of the 
formalistic answer in the legislative context, it seems like that answer is even 
less satisfactory for the rest of the administrative state.  Consider some of the 
problems with delegation.  The work of agencies is one step removed from the 
work of legislators.155  Of course, legislators can also be swayed more directly by 
voters when the issue catches popular attention – but this again presupposes that 
there is some concordance between the issues that catch popular attention and 
those that are normatively important.  One might plausibly conclude that 
153 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and Death, SCI. AM. 40 (May 1993)(describing 
democracies’ ability to avoid famines).  See also Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note___, 
at 163 n.1 (“[W]e consider the representativeness of the participatory input from the perspective 
of a concern with its impact on the communication of citizens’ needs and preferences to political 
elites and thus a concern with equal protection of interests”).
154 Cf. Rubin, supra note___, at ___ (suggesting that the existing arrangements for participation 
and decisionmaking in the administrative state are legitimate, and that excessive idealized 
thinking about democracy is confusing in this arena).
155 See, e.g., Theodore Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and 
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 296-312, 314-18, 321-22 (1987).Theodore Lowi, 
The End of Liberalism, in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 166, 169 (PETER H. SCHUCK 
ED., 1994)(“modern law has become a series of instructions to administrators rather than a series 
of commands to citizens”).
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delegations, on the margin, make it no easier and perhaps harder for the
members of the public to understand and monitor the law’s development --
particularly for those chunks of the public who have not yet decided if they 
care.
156
Notice also that the legal machinery of the administrative state opens up 
some possibilities for galvanizing participation that would be harder to achieve 
in a garden-variety collective decisionmaking process like a town meeting or a 
school board election.  In contrast to other collective decisionmaking procedures, 
the administrative state does its regulatory work through institutions that are 
explicitly designed to integrate technical and legal decisionmaking with some 
kind of public input.  This makes it a little easier to solve the administrability 
problems that might arise with alternative approaches to public engagement.  All 
of this should make one question whether the administrative pluralism model 
takes too narrow a view of public participation in the administrative state.
For some observers, the meager participation in shaping regulatory 
policy would be less problematic if citizens lacked the cognitive ability or 
personal interest to understand regulatory policy.  That would make it futile to 
involve the public.  On the surface, it certainly seems as though such deficiencies 
in the public’s interest and sophistication exist.  Lay people rarely say that they 
care about specific regulatory policies, even if they more frequently note their 
concern over substantive matters affected by regulatory policy such as privacy or 
environmental protection.  This generalized concern hardly seems like an 
appropriate basis to justify more public involvement in regulatory policy, since 
the lay public makes mistakes in understanding risk and glosses over important 
details of a regulatory issue.  Nonetheless, not every member of the public is 
equally unsophisticated: some people have perfectly relevant expertise but do not 
comment.  More provocatively, what if citizens’ interest and sophistication when 
156
 The argument is not that delegations are either undesirable or unconstitutional.  On the legal 
question, Posner and Vermeule, supra note ___, advance persuasive arguments against judicial 
invalidations of legislative action on nondelegation grounds.  Earlier, Mashaw argued in a similar 
vein in favor of delegating powers to the executive branch.  See Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: 
Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 81 (1985).  My point 
here is that delegations might make participation particularly important because they make 
elections less of an effective proxy for what voters think about regulatory issues.  There are, of 
course, exceptions that I have described earlier, where substantial chunks of the public acquire an 
intense interest in a regulatory decision.  See supra note__ (discussing the extent of interest in the 
tobacco and telecommunications media ownership regulations).  But leaving aside these 
exceptions, my conjecture is that high-profile legislative votes receive more attention than 
regulatory proceedings that become routine because they have been delegated.  Some members 
of the public take cues from interest groups with which they identify in trying to make sense of 
legal developments, and those groups might often keep track of regulatory policy.  But the 
literature on leadership dynamics within interest groups and the experience with Section 314 
highlight limits in the role interest groups can be expected to play in informing the public about 
policy developments. 
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thinking about matters like the Section 314 regulations or local media 
ownership were fluid?
B. Citizens’ Interest and Sophistication for Understanding Regulatory 
Policy Are Not Fixed
It turns out that neither interest nor sophistication is fixed.  Both are a 
product of how the law structures the opportunity for people to participate in 
regulatory policymaking.157  Just as juries change their perceptions during the 
course of a trial, so to can laypeople or even experts come to view issues 
differently after an opportunity to reflect.  This makes it strange to dismiss 
questions about the extent of participation in regulatory by insisting that citizens 
lack cognitive sophistication and interest.  Such an argument begs the question 
of whether the existing distribution of sophistication of interest is the “right” 
one, or whether the goal should be to engage the public by increasing their 
sophistication and interest in some way.
i.  Sophistication is not fixed
What sort of ability does a member of the public have to deal with 
Section 314 and the issues it raises?  An individual’s sophistication might be 
understood to mean her capacity to make insightful and coherent political 
decisions.  In this context, “insightful” means that the decisions or observations 
that the layperson makes are not otherwise available in the regulatory 
rulemaking activities of the administrative state (i.e., through representative 
politicians, experts, or public opinion polls).158  Coherence, meanwhile, refers to 
the idea that a participant’s views are not completely contradictory or incapable 
of assimilating relevant information to the decision.159 One might think that 
laypeople’s very experiences as laypeople might give them insight into how to 
value the harm done if government inappropriately discloses financial 
information.  On the other hand, voters’ apparently limited insight on other 
matters, and their apparent dearth of coherence might raise questions about how 
much a non-expert could really contribute to regulatory policy.160
157 See Luskin et al., supra note ___ (discussing deliberative polls to set utility prices in Texas); 
see also Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, & Roger Jowell, Considered Opinions: Deliberative 
Polling in Britain, 32 BRITISH J. POLI. SCI. 455 (2002) (noting that the opinion changes among 
participants in a “deliberative poll” in Britain on issues involving criminal justice do not seem to 
be driven by social-demographic factors such as income or education, but by a combination of 
factors including information gains).
158
 The “insightful” idea therefore overlaps a bit with the idea that there is distortion in the 
regulatory process that needs to be remedied.
159 Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ___, at 485 (“…it was those who wound up knowing 
most, and presumably had learned most, who changed most.”).
160 See, e.g., Patricia A. Hurley & Kim Q. Hill, The prospects for Issue-Voting in Contemporary 
Congressional Elections: An Assessment of Citizen Awareness and Representation, 8 AM. POL. 
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In fact the conventional wisdom is that most members of the public lack 
both the insight and coherence to play a useful role in informing regulatory 
policy.161 Laypeople tend to experience the world by using heuristics that 
simplify the complexity of their environment.162 Some of the problems people 
have in understanding risk are predictable, and so they can probably be corrected 
to some extent: in short, the mental short-cuts are not unchangeable.163  Their use 
depends to some extent on the environment.164  If people experience a change of 
setting or motivation, they can change the mental short-cuts they use to make 
sense of a problem.165  People can probably display some additional
sophistication and less reflexive reliance on a mental short-cuts if they think 
their opinion matters and they have access to more information.166  In contrast, 
public opinion polls only provide a momentary snapshot of what people think; 
providing people with information, and allowing them to think about it or 
deliberate, can result in something more meaningful.167
What all this implies is that individuals’ sophistication could be catalyzed 
enough to understand complicated regulations.  This observation is consistent 
with the preceding discussion of democratic accountability in the administrative 
Q. 425 (1980).  For a useful survey of some of the empirical studies raising questions about 
voters’ insight and coherence, see Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Public Opinion and 
Political Action, in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 659 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson 
eds., 3d ed. 1985).  
161 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993).  See also Jim Rossi, 
Participation Run Amok:  The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency 
Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997).
162 See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 144, at ____.  See also Sniderman, supra note 
2. 
163 See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 190 (2000).  Slovic reviews experimental 
evidence on perceptions of risk and concludes that “an accident that takes many lives may 
produce relatively little social disturbance… if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood 
system (e.g., a train wreck).  However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system…, such as a 
nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is 
perceived as a harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.”).
164 See, e.g.,  James P. Morris et al., Activation of Political Attitudes: A Psychophysiological 
Examination of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 24 POL. PSYCH. 727 (2003)(affectively charged 
political stimulus can affect evaluations of information).
165 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note ___, at 265 (describing how risk communication 
studies successfully informed the redesign of EPA information). 
166 See supra note ___, at  ___ (discussing research showing how changes in the setting can 
provoke people to use more sophisticated cognition to understand a complex problem).
167
 An entire research program in political science at one point seemed to indicate that public’s 
views were suffused with attitudes that had little if any coherence.  See See Helmut Norpoth & 
Milton Lodge, The Difference Between Attitudes and Nonattitudes in the Mass Public:  Just 
Measurement? 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 291 (1985) (noting that instability in responses to political 
attitude surveys is partly explained by “nonattitudes,” where respondents provide an opinion 
indicating that they have a particular attitude about an issue when they may not)..  See also
Luskin, supra note ___, at ____.  This research program, coupled with the inconsistencies and 
shortcomings in responses revealed by regular public opinion polls, makes some people question 
whether the public can ever make a useful direct contribution to choices in policymaking.
RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
57
pluralism model of public engagement.  Even the seemingly ridiculous 
comments about Section 314 cannot be dismissed completely, because a 
different process might evoke more sophisticated responses from the 
commenters.  This might be achieved for two different reasons: (1) a different 
process (i.e., explicitly putting risk profiles “on screen”) could inform the 
participants in some regulatory proceeding about what is at stake, and correct 
some of the limitations of the mental short-cuts they might be using; (2) 
signaling to someone that their opinion matters might give them incentives to 
become informed and analyze information on their own.  The question then 
becomes whether members of the lay public would have an interest in doing any 
of this. 
ii.  Interest is not fixed
Does the public care about Section 314, or does the relative lack of 
attention it has received amount to some kind of normatively attractive 
equilibrium?  Like sophistication, an individual’s perception of her interest in a 
particular issue is not static.  The motivation to understand an issue – like the 
motivation to get involved in political activity – can respond to changes in a 
person’s environment.  If forming an opinion on an issue seems costly and 
people believe there is little reason to do so, it is no mystery that people might
not invest in being informed.  Thus, a person planning to buy a car may not 
recognize that her vehicle’s purchase price might be driven in part by the safety 
record of the plant where the cars are manufactured, because lower safety might 
raise the wage that a company needs to offer workers, and (assuming 
competition does not constrain the manufacturer) the extra labor costs might be 
passed on to the consumer.  The preceding discussion sheds some light on how 
individuals’ sophistication react to the environment, which can help break the 
cycle where limited information contributes to lack of interest.  Regardless of 
whether the interest perceived is entirely self-regarding or not,168 people who 
overcome their lack of time or attention169 and participate are likely to be those 
who see specific value in such activity.  There is no good reason to think that 
perception of value will be fixed rather than dynamic.  
A contrary view would suggest that interests are more rigid, and in 
particular, that they are driven largely by financial and economic factors.  This 
view would emphasize the idea that when people have financial stakes in the 
outcome of a regulation (as do the banks in the case of Section 314), they will 
168 See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note___, at 529 (“In discussing the reasons they 
became active, participants make clear… that they think of themselves as acting for the common 
good.”).
169 See id., at 129 (surveying the public to assess the determinants of political activity, and finding 
those not active gave the following among the major reasons for not getting involved: lack of 
time, 39%; prioritizing family over the welfare of the polity, 34%; irrelevance of politics to 
“important things in… life,” 20%).
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exhibit an interest in the outcome.  Yet the reality is that people make decision 
on the basis of more than just their own material interests.  They also care about 
how other people in the polity are doing.170  And when they are concerned about 
their own situation, the concerns are not only about financial or economic 
status.171  This helps explain why dozens of individuals wrote to comment on the 
Section 314 regulations.  Nonetheless, interest in politics is rarely enough to 
make someone participate in political activity – time, money, and skills have 
also have a large effect.172
Now consider Section 314 in light of the preceding insights about the 
possibility of changing people’s perceptions of their interests.  The law’s effect 
is quite broad.  It can allow the financial transaction information of anyone in the 
country to be obtained by government agents as long as they fill out a 
certification.  It effectively creates a substantial limitation on the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act, and also lets financial institutions share information about 
anyone, with few limits.  Not all of this is apparent to the disaggregated mass of 
individuals who are going to be affected by this, not even those whose activities 
or positions might make them more liable to be affected by the new authority.  It 
would seem wrong to ascribe the apparent lack of interest among more people to 
a deliberate conclusion that Section 314 did not matter all that much.  Instead, it 
is entirely possible that they care but don’t think they will make a difference 
(i.e., the unsophisticated commenters on Section 314 did not make a difference, 
after all).  But information and a belief in one’s efficacy can change individuals’ 
sophistication and interest.
C. Public Engagement Is Not Anathema to Rigorous Risk Analysis
A lot of regulatory policy depends on rigorous risk analysis, where 
someone competent considers the extent to which a regulation might achieve a 
particular benefit given a certain cost.  Yet laypeople have in understanding 
170 See.e.g, Donald Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewit, Sociotropic Politics, 11 BRITISH J. POLI. SCI. 
129 (1981) (political attitudes not driven by views of personal material gain but by, among other 
things, conceptions of what would advance overall economic well-being).  Any framework that 
views political activity in terms of rational, goal-seeking behavior must still accept that it’s not 
just narrow material interest that makes people do things. 
171 See generally Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
“Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
172 See, e.g., Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, & Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES:  A 
Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 285 (1995) (developing 
and finding empirical support in cross-sectional studies of survey research for a model of 
political participation where interest in politics is not enough to explain political participation, 
and instead “[t]he resources of time, money, and skills are also powerful predictors of political 
participation in America”).
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information about probabilities.  Some commentators have argued for 
insulating administrative agencies from political and public interference on this 
basis.173
Nonetheless, the fact that people use mental short-cuts does not 
necessarily imply that different approaches to public engagement are 
incompatible with reasoned decision-making about risk.  Sometimes heuristics 
may represent a reasonable way for people to economize on decision costs.174 Of 
course, heuristics sometimes lead people astray.  For example, people often have 
trouble evaluating risk175 – and much of regulatory policy involves heavy doses 
of risk analysis. But this observation merits a few answers.  First, people do not 
always ignore probability information.176   Second, regulation is not entirely 
about risk.  Section 314, for example, also required the agency to make decisions 
about the extent of financial institutions’ administrative costs, and degree of 
financial privacy protections that should exist given the absence of a 
constitutional right to such privacy.177  Third, experts also have some problems 
dealing with risk.178  This means that disparaging heuristics does not necessarily 
imply that experts should replace laypeople.  It is no surprise that experts are 
often better at understanding risk and other complex concepts that affect 
regulation, but that understanding is itself not impervious to the impact of 
cognitive short-cuts.  Fourth, people’s failure to consider probabilities in a 
173 See Sunstein, Risk & Reason, supra note 3, at ___; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
STATE 139 (2002)(defending default rules giving agencies wide latitude to conduct-cost benefit 
analysis even when the legislature has not explicitly allowed it, in order to “increase the 
rationality and sense of regulatory policy”).
174 See, e.g., LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 144, at ____ (discussing how retrospective 
evaluations on key issues and other heuristics can help voters discipline policians); Sniderman, 
supra note 2, at ____.
175
 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) 
at 3.
176 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 67-68 (2002).    Sunstein 
writes:
By drawing attention to probability neglect, I do not mean to suggest that most people, 
most of the time, are indifferent to large variations in the probability that a risk will 
come to fruition.  Large variations can, and often do, make a difference – but when 
emotions are engaged, the difference is far less than the standard theory predicts.  Nor 
do I suggest that probability neglect is impervious to circumstances.  If the costs of 
neglecting probability are placed “on screen,” then people will be more likely to attend 
to the question of probability.
177
 Moreover, there is a distinction between risk – involving situations where probabilities can be 
assigned – and uncertainty – where probabilities are not known.  SEE JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING 
TECHNICAL CHANGE 185-207 (1983). While subjective probability estimates from experts are 
probably a great place to start in thinking about uncertainty, it may not be the only ingredient one 
would want to consider. Cf. McGarity, supra note___, at ___.  
178 See, e.g., SCOTT SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY 250-55 (1993).
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normatively defensible way can often be affected by the choice situation –
which is just another application of the larger principle that sophistication is 
partly endogenous to the choice setting.179  Fifth, some alternative approaches to 
public engagement could involve experts or other stakeholders who might be as 
sophisticated as the decisionmakers within the agency.  Finally, there is at least 
an open question whether some of the public’s likely distortions in considering 
risk (i.e., the dread of dying one way versus another way) should affect the 
assessment of certain risks.180
In some ways it seems the ambition of the administrative state has always 
been to provide a legal mechanism for harmonizing expert judgment and public 
input.  That’s what many of the system’s advocates and proponents say.181  The 
upshot is that alternative mechanisms for public engagement need not give the 
public a monopoly on the content of a regulatory rule, any more than the existing 
system – so strongly identified with the administrative pluralism strand of 
thinking – gives commenters total control over the resulting rule.  The challenge 
is to strike a balance.  One goal is to entice the administrative process to take 
public input seriously.  The other is to preserve the agency’s flexibility to act in 
accordance with executive branch policy prescriptions and the views of technical 
experts.  Which means one can imagine alternative methods of public input 
coexisting with technocratic schemes to inform regulatory policy, such as cost-
benefit analysis.182
Of course, there would be no point in striking a balance if one clung to a 
version of public engagement that was, by definition, satisfied with extent of
interest-group activity that the status quo accommodates.183  This is not the only 
way to see things.  One might believe instead in some version of “democracy” 
where the public makes informed and sophisticated contributions to the 
rulemaking process, where laypeople’s interest and sophistication are not taken 
as a given but rather as qualities that can be catalyzed, and where the agency is 
forced to take those insights seriously whether they come from bankers or 
bakers.  This view can be criticized or rejected in favor of the simpler one 
179 See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 91-92 (1996).
180
 Put differently, it may be very difficult in principle (and not just because of heuristics people 
use) to separate the evaluation of dreaded risks from the act of calculating its risk by itself.  This 
is admittedly questionable – but it is not obvious that such “dread” should always be rejected.   
181 See, e.g., Sunstein, Arsenic, supra note___, at ___. 
182 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Introduction: Cost Benefit Analysis – Legal, 
Economic, and Philsophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837, 838 (2000).  Adler and Posner 
note:
Even the proponents of cost-benefit analysis do not generally argue that it should be the 
sole decision procedure for administrative agencies and other governmental bodies.  
There may well be scenarios where it is welfare maximizing for agencies to employ 
some other procedure, such as… (nomonetized) mitidimensional assessment.  
183 Cf. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park:  Political and Judicial Controls Over 
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).
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implicit in the administrative pluralism model.  But that rejection needs to be 
explained.184
There may be a few reasons to look for alternative mechanisms to engage 
the public in regulatory policies like those involving Section 314.  One is simply 
the chance to advance some workable version of participatory democracy by 
advantage of the legal structure of the administrative state, which is already set 
up to harmonize public participation and technical competence.  Some people 
may care simply because they think administrative pluralism is just not a very 
convincing theory of the legitimacy of the administrative state.  Still others 
might recognize practical reasons to look for new options for achieving public 
engagement: alternative arrangements could allow regulators to obtain different 
kinds of information about public reactions to regulatory policy.  That 
information may later become politically or technically valuable, such as when 
an exogenous shock like a terrorist attack suddenly makes transportation security 
far more salient than the typical poll respondent might have thought before 
September 11.  And regulators charged with crafting rules that depend on public 
compliance (e.g., speed limits) may benefit from alternative mechanisms that 
shed richer insight into public perceptions of regulatory issues.  But how would 
these alternatives work in practice?
IV.
CORRECTIVE AND MAJORITARIAN DELIBERATION APPROACHES ARE 
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING MODES OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
The existing approach to public engagement has a tenacious hold, but 
there is no reason why the administrative state should be imprisoned by it.  
Alternative arrangements are both possible and (I shall argue) desirable.  For 
example, a corrective approach would try to sample people that should 
obviously have interest but are not adequately represented (with some 
appropriate metric for making this decision).  The majoritarian deliberation
approach would involve getting a stratified random sample of the population as a 
whole.185  Either one of the alternative approaches could involve selecting a small 
group or groups through stratified random sampling of some population (i.e., the 
national population, or some subgroup especially likely to be affected).  The 
difference in these approaches reflects two different conceptions of participatory 
democracy – one focused on the importance of including interests who will be 
particularly affected by the decision, and another on creating a space for people 
184
 Some might take my criticisms and conclude outright tha public engagement should not be so 
central to the legitimacy of the administrative state.  I think that position is hard to sustain for 
reasons discussed earlier involving the value of democracy.  See supra note___.  
185 Obviously, at some level the entire population has some kind of “interest,” so the distinction 
between the two approaches is driven by how low one sets the “interest” threshold.
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to engage in majoritarian deliberation about the regulatory matter in question.186
In principle, individuals and groups consulted through these alternative 
approaches could offer both their raw initial opinions but also their reactions to 
information about the nature of the agency’s mandate, the scientific and 
technical problems with different regulatory possibilities, and the views of 
different constituencies that would be affected by the regulation.  The existence 
of these alternatives does not mean the existing approach is always wrong: 
letting participation be driven by self-designated interested parties might make 
sense, or it might not.  Like everything in life, these alternatives have costs – but 
they should be judged alongside their potential benefits.  That is exactly the 
point:  choosing between all these approaches poses the question of when it is 
just fine to use the existing administrative pluralism approach, when we should 
be more interested in including people affected but not organized to participate, 
and when it is better to let regulatory decisions be informed by deliberation 
groups that are explicitly majoritarian in nature.  
A. The Core of the Corrective Approach is a Mechanism to Identify 
Stakeholders and to Integrate Their Views Into the Regulatory Process
Practices like negotiated rulemaking occasionally involve agencies in 
figuring out who might be affected by a particular rulemaking proceeding.187
Through negotiated rulemaking, the agency determines who might be interested 
in participating in the rulemaking proceeding in order to reach an early 
consensus on the proposed rule.  But the point of negotiated rulemaking is not 
explicitly to identify people or constituencies who might have a particular 
interest and yet run the risk of being unrepresented.  Instead, the major purpose 
of negotiated rulemaking is to enhance rules, reduce litigation, and shorten the 
rulemaking process by providing a mechanism for consensus rulemaking 
proposals.188
186
 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady capture this distinction nicely.  See supra note___, at 528:
In one conception of democracy, politics is the arena for the working out of the self-
interested claims of citizens.  According to this view of the meaning of democracy, 
participatory inequalities matter because they jeopardize equal protection of interests…. 
There is another conception of democracy embedded in our discussion for which our 
findings are germane.  According to this vision, a democracy in which self-interested 
citizens compete for benefits is inadequate.  In a fully participatory democracy, political 
activity becomes a mechanism whereby citizens engage in enlightened discourse, some 
to understand the views of others, and become sensitized to the needs of the community 
and the nation.
187 See generally Matthew J. McKinney, Negotiated Rulemaking:  Involving Citizens in Public 
Decisions, 60 MONT. L. REV. 499 (1999).
188
 Note that negotiated rulemaking does not always seem to live up to its expectations.  See, e.g., 
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. REV. 
386 (2001).
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Imagine extending just one aspect of the agency’s mandate during a 
negotiated rulemaking procedure – identifying interests that are likely to be 
particularly affected by the regulation.  The goal here would not be to speed up 
the regulatory process but instead to do something that might seem to go in 
precisely the opposite direction: including people who will clearly be impacted 
by the regulation but may lack the sophistication to gracefully articulate their 
concerns, and giving those people a chance to constructively voice their 
interests.  The process would involve at least three components: (1) selecting a 
“corrective” sample of people, (2) providing a setting in which they could voice 
their concerns in a way that corrects for deficiencies in sophistication (i.e., 
through assistance from counsel or a facilitator), and (3) devising a process 
through which an agency would be nudged to take seriously the resulting 
opinions.  A lawyer from the agency or an independent agency might then be 
charged with advocating for the deliberation group’s ideas.189
Imagine how this could work in the context of Section 314.  The agency 
charged with issuing the regulations (i.e., Treasury), perhaps along with a 
separate specialized agency focused on public engagement (call it a participation 
agency),190 make an initial determination about who is likely to be particularly 
affected by the regulations but unlikely to represent themselves – including, 
among others, smaller banks and credit unions, bank employees, or legitimate 
customers particularly likely to be concerned about privacy.  No doubt that it 
would be difficult to design a defensible system for choosing “who will be 
especially affected yet unlikely to adequately represent themselves.”  
Together, Treasury and the participation agency might break down the 
task into a few different pieces.  One is to define the kinds of benefits and 
burdens that could be caused by the proposed regulation if it went into effect 
(i.e., privacy intrusions that could result in unauthorized disclosure, changes in 
the probability of being subjected to time-consuming, costly, or harrowing 
investigation, new tasks for financial institution employees).  Another is to make 
189
 The lawyer’s role would be to represent overall tendency of the deliberative group’s 
conclusion.  In the absence of consensus, the lawyer would highlight the group’s majority 
position, with perhaps some brief additional attention to the views of any significant minority.  
All of this raises the question of how the agenda for the group’s discussion will be set, how the 
materials and moderator for the discussion will be selected, and how the lawyer’s incentives will 
be structured to foster faithful representation of the group’s views.  These are not always easy 
questions, but they can be solved.  Jury deliberations, mock jury and focus group arrangements, 
deliberative polls, and experimental studies all shed some light on how to resolve the issue of 
agenda-setting, moderators, and materials.  The lawyers’ behavior can be addressed in part 
through employee selection and performance audits.  Which raises the question of how executive 
branch officials, legislators, and interest groups affect the process.  I deal with this in Part V, 
infra. 
190
 The separate agency can serve as an important repository of expertise – which is hardly 
irrelevant here and may shed important light on how to determine who is interested.  A variation 
on this would make the centralized agency more specialized – focusing on the representation of 
people with particular kinds of interests, such as privacy concerns.  
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some considered judgment about who among members of the general 
population may disproportionately bear the preceding benefits and costs.  The 
methodology for making this determination could range from relying in part on a 
sub-sample of people who wrote in comments (admittedly an imperfect 
mechanism, but perhaps suitable for some issues) to computer simulations or 
good-faith estimates.  In any case, the goal here would be to get a picture of how 
the regulation might operate in a world where the agency making use of it (in 
this case, an entity like the FBI) would be making discretionary decisions about 
its use.  This phase of the process could result, for example, in a conclusion that 
recent immigrants from the Middle East who make small wire transfers would be 
especially likely to trigger scrutiny.191  Finally, once the agency has made this 
determination, it might consider whether the constituencies disproportionately 
affected are constructively represented in the process.  This might include 
considering the sophistication (or even existence) of comments from some of the 
impacted constituencies.  The agency would then select a small number of 
people in the “underrepresented” constituencies to take part in the rulemaking 
process.192
How exactly would the selected participants take part in the regulatory 
process?  A mass of comments that do not even distinguish between the Patriot 
Act (let alone Section 314) and the regulations themselves would not be as 
useful as comments that acknowledge that Section 314 is the law of the land 
while providing specific suggestions of how to write the desired regulations.  At 
least two possibilities are worth considering here.  One is to provide people with 
a sort of deliberative forum.  Some group of people numbering between 7 and 15
might be chosen to deliberate.193  They would all get balanced materials 
explaining the arguments for and against the proposed regulation.194  Then they 
would get the chance to talk to each other and question experts from the agency 
about the possible alternatives.  The agency would use the existing proposed 
regulations as a basis for discussion.  The goal of the deliberation would not be 
191 Cf. Cuéllar, supra note ___, at ____.
192
 The resulting assemblage of participations could not be called representative of the interests of 
the larger population.  While the notion of the government deciding who to include as affected 
parties may strike some as troubling, it is not without precedent: government agencies often have 
a legal obligation to consider the implication of a regulatory rule on some relatively 
unrepresented constituency, like small business.  See, e.g., Exec. Order 13272 (requiring 
agencies to consider the implications of their regulations on small businesses).  It is not obvious 
that allowing agencies to simply claim that they are considering the interests of a constituency 
results is better than actually getting people from that constituency to comment.  During the 
Carter Administration, the Department of Agriculture sought to obtain more comments from 
groups that were affected by regulations establishing agricultural marketing orders for 
commodities.  Among other things, the department investigated “public attitudes and views on a 
planned marketing order through a solicitation of comments mailed directly to affected groups.”  
Kerwin, supra note___, at 171.
193 See SIDNEY VERBA, SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1961).
194
 The agency would prepare these with oversight from the centralized agency.
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to subject the regulations to an up-or-down vote but rather to elicit concerns, 
observations, and ideas about how the regulation should evolve.195  Part of what 
the process would have to accomplish is to separate the factual issues best 
resolved through expert analysis from interpretation of an ambiguous statute and 
policy judgments.  The deliberation group would be in a position to inform what 
to do about the latter but not necessarily the former.196
Finally there is the question of giving legal effect to the corrective 
sample’s deliberations.  For the moment, imagine only that their deliberations 
inform the rulemaking process and become part of the record.  Accordingly, the 
public can raise valid concerns given the statutory scheme, and these in turn can 
become a basis for litigation.  Later I will consider other alternatives that give 
legal effect to the deliberations.197  In the meantime, the most important point is 
that the corrective sample’s deliberations would have some legal effect – for 
example, by creating a presumption in favor of a particular regulatory strategy, 
such as the issuance of Section 314 regulations with a remedy for unauthorized 
disclosure of sensitive financial information.
B. The Majoritarian Deliberation Approach Calls For Obtaining a Sample 
of Citizens to Deliberate
This leaves another alternative to the administrative pluralism model -- 
the majoritarian approach.  By “majoritarian,” I mean the idea that decisions are 
best made by deliberative, electoral majorities or some sort of equivalent proxy.  
A popular referendum is not the only way to involve a wider slice of the public 
in regulatory decisions.  Majoritarian deliberation implies a process where a 
majority makes a decision in accordance with its views about what would be best 
195 Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ___, at 463.  Their description of a deliberative poll 
in the United Kingdom provides one example of how the deliberation groups could function:
On Friday evening, the participants spent 45 minutes in plenary session being 
welcomed, watching a brief documentary describing the issues they would be 
discussing, and being reminded of what lay before them.  On Saturday, they spent three-
and-a-half hours in small group discussions, then three hours in large group exchanges 
with panels of experts fielding questions, then another hour back in the small groups.
The difference here, of course, is that the subject matter is not as general as what participants in 
the deliberative poll had to discuss.  Instead of fairly open-ended questions about criminal justice 
policy (for example), the basis for discussion among the deliberation groups would be the 
agency’s proposed rule.
196 See Part IV.a
197 See id. for additional technical details involving the presentation of information to the 
deliberation group.
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for the polity.198  Regardless of whether this is practically feasible (it may not 
be), it represents a particular view of what regulatory policymaking should be.  
To some people the legislature (and perhaps even the rulemaking 
process) is already providing a mechanism to represent majority views.  All this 
talk about a “majoritarian” deliberation alternative may therefore seem confusing 
since the regulatory rulemaking process is often analogized to the legislative 
process, which is often assumed to be majoritarian.199  But neither the rulemaking 
process nor legislation necessarily live up to this idea.  For one, electoral 
majorities can differ in their views about regulatory policy when compared to 
mobilized, economically and politically powerful interest groups.200  The 
preceding sections highlight how different the reality of the regulatory 
rulemaking process is from some kind of ideal version of majoritarian 
deliberation.  To be sure, elected politicians can intervene on behalf of electoral 
majorities to affect regulatory policy when the issues in question have mass 
political appeal.  But once again, this sort of argument assumes a view about 
democracy that has to be defended.  The administrative pluralism view leaves it 
to interest groups and voters to figure out what matters in regulatory policy, and 
in politics more generally.  Anything that is not already important enough to 
voters when it comes time to vote or make a donation to an interest group is 
assumed not to matter.
In contrast, the majoritarian deliberation alternative is grounded in the 
premise that perhaps democracy should consider individuals’ informed opinions, 
not just their superficial reactions.  As with the corrective approach, the idea is 
that informing people and giving them a chance to deliberate could shed light on 
what satisfies their own interests.  In addition, the chance to learn and deliberate 
might signal to participants that there is some value in thinking beyond their self-
interest when they consider the regulatory decision.201
198
 It is the sort of process reminiscent of Rousseau’s discission of the “general will.”  See JEAN-
JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 5 
(WORDSWORTH CLASSICS 1998) (1762).
199 See generally ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM (2001)
200
 By “electoral majorities,” I mean majorities of voters in a particular jurisdiction.  What 
constitutes a majority obviously depends on the boundaries of the jurisdiction and the process 
through which preferences are aggregated.  See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN, & PILDES, supra note 
148, at 1 (“At the heart of a democratic political order lies a process of collective decisionmaking 
that must operate through pre-existing laws, rules, and institutions.  The kind of democratic 
politics we have is always and inevitably itself a product of institutional forms and legal 
structures.”).
201
 This is not meant to suggest that individual participants could ever (or should) put aside their 
own interests.  Such interests are important and the existing model does not represent these.  
Moreover, personal interests may serve as a heuristic through which voters can form views about 
a complicated policy.  Nonetheless, the deliberative process might expand the scope of that 
inquiry and get people to think about how others might be affected.   Whether this happens 
because people are genuinely capable of altruism or because people simply further expand the 
scope of their own evaluations of their self-interest does not really matter that much.  The point is 
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Implementing the majoritarian deliberation approach is a lot like 
implementing the corrective approach: there needs to be a way of selecting the 
sample of people, a space to deliberate and learn about the issue, and a means of 
giving their input at least some legal effect.  The major difference is in the 
selection of the sample.  Here the participation agency would not need to figure 
out a way to discern who might be especially affected.  Instead the animating 
vision of democracy here is to provide a group of laypeople (as a proxy for a 
majority) with the chance to shape the regulatory process.  If the goal is 
something other than a referendum, then the group would have to be small 
enough to make it feasible to educate its members and to give them a chance to 
deliberate among themselves.202  In short, the process would involve selecting a 
stratified random sample of people from throughout the country, helping them 
understand Section 314, and asking them what they think.  As before, a lot of the 
choices about the structure of the deliberative process are really about how to 
create the relevance condition.  To the extent that such a relevance condition 
could be met, the majoritarian deliberation approach would focus on eliciting the 
views of people regarding what regulation would be in the putative interests of 
the polity, rather than on considering whether people with strong interests 
support or oppose the policy in question.
C. Some of the Technical Challenges Posed by Either Approach Could be 
Resolved by Creating an Independent Agency
Both the corrective and the majoritarian deliberation alternatives share 
the same three major technical problems: selecting the sample, creating the 
opportunity for the sample of people to learn and deliberate (i.e., in a way that 
fulfills the third condition), and deciding what legal impact will be given to the 
public’s input.  The participation agency to which I have already alluded could 
help solve all these problems and protect the integrity of the public engagement 
process.
In some rare cases agencies may be able to implement the alternatives 
with their existing resources and legal authorities.  But the real promise of the 
alternatives might best be realized through the creation of a separate agency.  
The new “participation agency” could handle several functions that would all 
support government decisionmaking about regulatory policy, and in particular 
public participation in the regulatory process.  A separate agency would have a 
specific mandate to enhance decisionmaking across agencies, without having to 
concern itself with competing tasks involving civil servants and political 
appointees who get invested with a specific point of view.  Its leadership might 
consist of a board of appointees with fixed, staggered terms.  Their job would be 
that they might view an issue differently when they have a chance to talk to people about it and 
learn about it.  Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ____, at ____.
202 See Hackman, supra note___, at___.
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to supervise the staff in discharging a few interrelated functions.  First, the 
agency would promulgate rules203 for how members of the public would be 
selected to participate in deliberation groups.  Second, the agency would prepare 
risk and cost-benefit analysis materials that would be presented to either 
corrective or majoritarian deliberation groups.  These analyses would be 
designed to complement those of the agency with direct responsibility for the 
regulatory program.  Deliberation groups would therefore get more than one 
point of view about the risks, costs, and benefits associated with any given 
proposal.  Third, the participation agency would provide trained moderators to 
facilitate the discussion among either the corrective or the majoritarian 
deliberation groups.  Finally, the agency would provide the lawyers to take the 
contributions of participants and turn these into more sophisticated comments 
that would become part of the administrative record.
The agency would also have the responsibility of promoting the 
participation of people selected to be part of the deliberation group associated 
with the majoritarian deliberation approach.  This would require legislation 
giving people some incentive to participate (or forcing them to bear some cost if 
they did not).  Potential participants could be enticed with a financial reward, a 
mild penalty for non-participation, or a combination of both.  Otherwise valuable 
people would be excluded and there would be overrepresentation of people for 
whom the opportunity cost of participation is lower.  This is probably what 
happens when laypeople participate in the notice and comment process.  While 
the participants in the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding made intelligible 
contributions and raised concerns about an important issue, neither their degree 
of unsophistication, nor their substantive views, are likely to be representative of 
the larger public.  Members of the public with more sophistication are likely to 
be the kinds of people who face a higher opportunity cost from participating in 
rulemaking instead of spending time with their kids, their friends, their garden, 
or advancing their careers.  If the alternatives are to enrich the administrative 
state with perspectives that are largely ignored today, then there must be 
participation from among these higher-opportunity cost folk.  In any case, the 
defining features of the alternatives would be to get participants as close to the 
actual decision as possible, instead of keeping their input general.  The more 
specific the feedback, transmitted through a moderator or legal representative, 
the more possible it would be for the implementing agency to grapple directly 
with public input about specific proposals.204
203
 The first set of rules could be promulgated subject to the traditional notice-and-comment 
process to avoid an infinite regress problem.
204
 Otherwise the implementing agency has to do all the work of translating vague opinions into 
regulations, which may be no different from agency responses to a vague delegation and 
therefore no different from the status quo.  Obviously, there is a limit to the public’s potential 
sophistication (even after all the institutional reforms I have described).  My point is that 
sophistication is not fixed in the “low” position.  The people participating in the corrective 
mechanism will have less of a challenge, because (by definition) they will be motivated by their 
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 There is also the question of how much all this would cost.  Between 
1981 and 2000, the number of regulations considered important enough to be 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget totaled 34,386.205  While this 
averages to about 3,800 a year, the number of rules reviewed in some years is 
considerably less (about 500 per year in the late 1990s).206 Depending on the 
details of how they are structured, the alternatives might cost as little as a focus 
group.  The higher the projected cost, the more it would make sense to try the 
proposals through a pilot project. Regardless of whether the alternatives are 
implemented through pilot projects, I do not expect the agency would to solve all 
the problems associated with the alternatives.  But it could help address them 
and in the process it would create opportunities to protect the public engagement 
process from naked manipulation by the agencies or their political superiors.
D. The Alternatives to Pluralism Force A Choice Between Different Kinds of 
Administrative Democracy
By making it possible to supplement or replace the administrative 
pluralism model, the alternatives would force a choice between different 
conceptions of administrative democracy.  Different issues may call for 
dissimilar versions of democracy.  If it is possible to solve the technical 
problems associated with the alternative approaches to public involvement in the 
administrative state, then how is one to choose among them?  That depends on 
the version – or vision – of democracy that seems appropriate for particular 
kinds of problems.  The question is difficult because there is no one right 
answer.  Prosperous countries mix and match different kinds of democratic 
procedures successfully.207  This implies that economic and political prosperity 
do not depend completely on adoption of a vision of democracy.208  Neither does 
the U.S. Constitution hardwire a single version of democracy for the 
administrative state, even if it does proscribe many features of representative 
stake in the outcome (they may even be experts with a “professional” stake in the regulatory 
policy).  The majoritarian mechanism could take advantage of techniques like panels of 
competing experts, contingent valuation, and pedagogically sound uses of analogical reasoning, 
the public participating 
205 See Steven P. Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 846 (2003).  The Office of Management and Budget 
Reviews only “economically major” and otherwise “significant” rules, and only 1,693 were 
economically significant during the relevant time-period.
206 Id.
207 See, e.g., DAVID M. FARRELL, COMPARING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1997).
208
 This is not to say that visions of democracy are inconsequential.  As I have argued in this 
paper, visions of democracy matter because they allow for different kinds of participation and 
different sorts of information to reach decisionmakers.  Differing visions of democracy do more 
than just create expectations about law and government.  They reward some interests and 
disadvantage others.  The point is that practical constraints involving economic development and 
politics do not rule out all but one particular version of democracy in the administrative state.
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political institutions.209  Indeed, while the federal constitution’s architecture 
obviously relies heavily on representative politics,210 legislatures can delegate 
power.  That opens up the question of how democracy should work its way into 
the regulatory process, and what kind of democracy one prefers.  Here I provide 
some notes about how one might think through these questions.
The most important point here is that participation has costs as well as 
benefits.211  I have argued elsewhere that rethinking public engagement can result 
in regulations that might be more widely accepted and appreciated if the public 
learned their details.  The alternatives could also provide agencies and 
representative politicians with useful information about how to communicate 
risk to the public, and would help make the regulatory system more consistent 
with its alleged aspiration of taking seriously the concerns raised by the public.212
At the same time, the alternatives will have some financial costs.  Hiring 
moderators, lawyers, and analysts takes money, as does the compensation of 
people selected to be part of the deliberation groups.  Moreover, participation 
can slow down regulation.  Deliberation groups would need to be chosen, 
constituted, and dismissed.  Agency lawyers would need to take more time to 
think about the concerns raised in the deliberation groups.  Delay is not always a 
problem, as poorly thought-out regulation may be worse than no regulation at 
all.  But it may be a problem in the sense that statutes passed by Congress reflect 
an interest in getting regulations implemented.  All of this means that the 
benefits of the alternatives may not always exceed the costs.213
Even if one does not accept that the alternative approaches rest on a 
uniformly “better” or more defensible approach to democracy, one might accept 
209
 But note that the Constitution leaves open many of the most important rules of electoral 
competition.  The Voting Rights Act, the recent electoral reform legislation and associated 
appropriations, and the requirement that the House of Representatives have only 435 members 
are just a few examples of how some of the rules of the political game are not set directly by the 
constitutional text.
210
 The “Republican guarantee” clause has been held not to mean much of anything as a practical 
matter. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (finding no violation and stating 
“[T]he Guarantee Clause has been an infrequent basis for litigation throughout our history. In 
most of the cases in which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the 
claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine.); Murtishaw v. 
Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 961 (9th Cir. 2001) (“challenge based on the Guarantee Clause, 
however, is a nonjusticiable political question”); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 27 (2nd 
Cir 1996) (noting traditionally “claims brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable 
political questions” and to the extent that this is not always the case, exceptions are rare).  Direct 
democracy is not considered per se a violation of any federal constitutional guarantee against 
arbitrary decisions, see Cuhyoga Falls, xx U.S. at ___ (2003), or any other kind of constitutional 
guarantee for that matter.  
211 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 161, at ___.
212 See supra Part II.b____ .
213
 The question of regulatory agency inaction is worth thinking about separately.  One might 
think that Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), is wrong, but as it stands today it limits the 
public’s ability (or that of any interest group) to compel regulatory action.
RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
71
that choosing the right kind of approach to public engagement depends a little 
on the circumstances.  For example, one might imagine a few relevant criteria.  
1. First is the question of how much the regulation has a direct, 
disproportionate impact on particular groups and individuals.214  In the 
context of Section 314, this might mean (in addition to financial 
institutions) people who are especially likely to arouse suspicion or who 
might have particularly strong (but perfectly legal) reasons to seek 
privacy in their financial records.  One might think that some policies just 
violate “rights,” but the language of rights is not necessary to conclude 
that some issues are best suited to the corrective approach because of 
their disproportionate impact on a limited number of people not 
adequately served by the administrative pluralism model of public 
engagement.
2. Just as the concentration of costs matters, so might the dispersal or 
concentration of benefits.  Section 314 might be an example: the alleged 
benefits of added national security are not concentrated among a few 
people (although in reality law enforcement authorities might benefit 
disproportionately).  This sort of pattern might highlight the value of 
something like the majoritarian deliberation approach.
3. Quite apart from whether the statutory requirements primarily call for an 
explicitly technical or scientific determination, there is the question of 
just how much an individual layperson can understand.  I have argued 
that the capacity (or “sophistication”) is more malleable than has been 
recognized.  Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine a situation where the 
legislature passes an ambiguous statute that still depends primarily on 
scientific knowledge.  One could argue if there is any such thing as pure 
“scientific knowledge,” but some issues are more opaque than others to 
laypeople.215
Is it possible for the administrative state to avoid all these questions?  Of 
course it is.  The machinery of regulation would then grind on relying only on 
the administrative pluralism model, spinning out its regulatory rules, working 
214
 Some people might insist that impact should be understood in the aggregate, so that a less 
direct impact affecting a large number of people should be given some weight.  Obviously, a 
major feature of the majoritarian deliberation alternative is its capacity to pierce through the 
public’s initial impression that an issue simply does not concern them.  But there should be some 
separate discussion about people who may be said to bear a particularly heavy and direct cost of 
a regulation, such as individuals living close to a proposed Superfund site, or workers who have 
been shown through some defensible analysis to be at particularly high risk of losing their job if 
the regulation is implemented.
215 See, e.g., Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note ____, at ____.
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through its legal powers, and balancing its deceptively simple scale of costs and 
benefits.  That path implies blindness – both to alternative conceptions of 
democracy and to the concerns that might otherwise inform the administrative 
state.  It makes little sense to regulate  by pretending that some important costs 
or benefits are just not there, and neither does it make sense to ignore questions 
about the appropriate kind of administrative democracy.  The problem is politics 
makes it easy to choose blindness.
V.
THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IS THEIR 
POLITICAL VIABILITY
As a theory of legitimacy, administrative pluralism does a lot of work for 
the administrative state.  It helps put the existing approach in the best possible 
light, solving a cluster of questions about how the public should be involved in 
regulatory decisionmaking.  Here I discuss some of the political economy behind 
the tenacious hold of the existing approach and the conceptual theory that 
supports it. I also sketch three political scenarios that might give life to the 
alternative approaches that I have described.  Since these scenarios depend on 
certain preconditions, some of which are unlikely, no one is likely to topple the 
administrative pluralism model anytime soon.
A. The Major Players in Regulatory Policy Find the Existing Approach Attractive
Beyond all the conceptual appeal of administrative pluralism, there is 
also a straightforward political reality bolstering the existing, interest-group 
centered approach to public engagement: what the legislature delegates and the 
president oversees can affect interest groups endowed with economic and 
political power, who can themselves affect representative politicians.216  Later I 
explain how this makes the administrative pluralism model difficult to change.217
For now it is enough to observe that legislatures shaping the developing 
administrative system probably harbored a substantial interest in contributing to 
the development of an administrative state that could be subject to their 
oversight, and (just as important) could generate information about the impact of 
regulatory policy on important constituencies.  Viewed in this light, the APA and 
its notice-and-comment procedures become part of a fire-alarm approach to 
overseeing the bureaucracy.  As one article describes it: 
216
 By this I mean specifically interest groups that command sufficient economic and political 
resources to materially impact (though not necessarily to determine) the success of representative 
politicians in their electoral pursuit of office or in the realization of related political objectives.
217 See infra Part IV.c, at _____.
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When something goes awry, constituents pull the fire alarm, bringing the 
attention of political officials down on agency proceedings.  To the extent 
that sustained congressional attention is costly to an agency, it will seek to 
avoid attention by serving congressional constituents so that alarms do not 
get pulled.  Nevertheless, if agencies can keep their actions secret, especially 
if they can conspire with particular interests against others, congressional 
interests might not know about agency proceedings until it is too late… The 
APA helps mitigate this problem by requiring a substantial degree of 
transparency…  Affected constituents must be notified in advance of 
proceedings and given opportunities to participate and provide their views.218
If politicians care about fire alarms and interest group opposition, then they 
would want a system that responds to political power as well as interest.  The 
resulting model of public engagement would predictably have a focus on 
generating information about the views of people and groups who would most be 
willing to expend resources to shape the regulations in question – or to punish 
politicians and bureaucrats for an unwelcome one. 
The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure (issued in 1941) suggests that even before passage of the APA, 
agencies already understood the value of avoiding confrontation with interest 
groups that might undermine the agency in Congress:
Early in the present century a number of agencies appear to have adopted 
regularized consultation in connection with their rule-making processes…. 
The practice of holding conferences of interested parties in connection with 
rule-making introduces an element of give-and-take on the part of those 
present and affords an assurance to those in attendance that their evidence 
and points of view are known and will be considered.  As a procedure for 
permitting private interests to participate in the rule-making process it is as 
definite and may be as adequate as a formal hearing.  If the interested parties 
are sufficiently known and are not too numerous or too hostile to discuss the 
problems presented conferences have evident advantages over hearings in the 
development of knowledge and understanding.219
The report implies that the goal of administrative procedures to involve 
the public should be to involve interested parties.  None of this implies that 
powerful interest groups would exclusively rely on administrative procedures 
like the notice-and-comment process to signal their displeasure to politicians.  
Interested parties could also rely on having their allies serve as political 
appointees or deploying congressional staffers to gather information.  Nor is it 
218
 McNollgast, supra note 17, at 199.
219 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note ___, at 103-04.
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necessary to argue that the sole or primary purpose of administrative procedures 
was to benefit politicians’ favored interest groups.220  Instead the contention is 
that, on balance, the APA and associated procedures probably helped (and 
continues to help) politicians track the reactions of outside interest groups, a 
development that in turn could advance their electoral and policy agendas.
Thus there is more than just a conceptual attraction to the administrative 
pluralism model.  There is a political and economic logic behind its brawn.  The 
result is a system that does not necessarily benefit everyone, nor does it live up 
to all the ideals participatory democracy.  But the administrative pluralism model 
certainly makes it easier for interest groups and representative politicians to 
work with the administrative state to achieve their goals.
B.  The Status Quo Can Be Upset Under Certain Conditions
All of the preceding makes any substantive change in the direction of the 
alternatives quite difficult.  But change is not necessarily impossible, so in 
closing let me provide a sketch of three scenarios that could bolster the 
alternatives.  The three scenarios reflect the premise that ambiguous statutes do 
not represent legislators’ genuine desire to defer to experts, but instead a political 
compromise.221  That compromise may, in turn, be affected by politicians’ 
guesses about what sorts of policies are politically palatable.222  Figuring out 
what precisely is politically acceptable (by congressional district, by state, or by 
national electorate) is difficult, perhaps even for politicians who survive a 
competitive process weeding out the ones who cannot do the figuring very well.  
Nonetheless, some guesses about the political popularity of legislation are 
probably easier to make than others, and sometimes politicians just get it 
wrong.223
Here is one scenario.  Politicians often use opinion polls as an important 
tool for shedding light on what voters want.  The information they provide can 
supplement politicians’ own sense of how voters stand on the issues most likely 
to matter in elections (such as crime and the economy).  Meanwhile, with few 
exceptions regulatory issues are likely to seem uninteresting and relatively 
unimportant by comparison, unless of course there is a some incident or shock, 
making a previously unimportant issue very relevant.  For example, the 
September 11 attacks could transform terrorist financing counter-measures from 
something marginally important into a centrally important issue.  The same 
220 Contra Balla, supra note___, at ___.
221 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality 
Disorders:  The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN L. REV. 627 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agremeents, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
222 See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note __, at ___
223 See, e.g., John Hardin, An In-Depth Look at Congressional Committee Jurisdiction 
Surrounding Health Issues, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 517 (1998)(describing legislators’ 
travails involving catastrophic health insurance amendments to Medicare-Medicaid).
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could be said for transportation security policy.  In such situations, voters’ pre-
crisis responses in opinion polls would not provide an accurate perspective about 
the electorate’s take on things after the crisis.  This means that politicians would 
have to be guessing how a crisis could affect the public’s judgment, and 
therefore the politicians’ prospects in future elections.
To some extent, experts and agencies working under the aegis of the 
executive branch serve as proxies for public engagement.  They can also help 
solve controversial matters for which politicians occasionally want to avoid 
responsibility.  But the alternative approaches could perform useful functions, 
helping provide additional insulation from responsibility when politicians have 
to deal with a hot potato.  One useful function would be to help provide an 
additional line of insulation from responsibility when politicians have to 
prospectively deal with a scalding hot potato – a means of dropping a cool 
dollop of sour cream on the potato by saying “we didn’t make a decision, and it 
was so important we didn’t even want the experts to do it by themselves.  We 
had real people help us make the decision.”  The logic of this scenario would 
make the viability of the alternatives depend on politicians’ beliefs about the 
state of the world.  The alternatives would be most attractive in the following 
situation: (a) there is a high enough probability that a low-importance issue 
might skyrocket in importance later on; and (b) they cannot guess what a voter 
would think once circumstances forced her to reflect more about it.  This means 
that at least sometimes, a deliberation group could help politicians go about their 
business of supervising the work of the administrative state.224  If the alternatives 
were politically valuable to legislators but faced bureaucratic resistance, outside 
interest groups might fund corrective or majoritarian deliberation proceedings 
and then funnel the results to agencies through the existing notice-and-comment 
process (perhaps with a quick “cc:” – the equivalent of a knowing glance – to 
interested legislators).  The corrective or deliberative proceedings themselves 
might be conducted by companies or not-for-profit organizations with a 
reputational interest in the integrity of the results. 
Now imagine a different scenario.  The alternatives are promoted by 
political entrepreneurs and become popular among the public.  They are not 
diluted because they are used to resolve statutory ambiguities in areas where the 
interest group context is not strong enough to predetermine the result.  So 
imagine that for some issues, interested parties lack the power or interest to 
achieve objectives through the existing approach.  Think, for example, of 
224
 If legislators decide that there is a high probability of an exogenous shock dramatically 
increasing the salience of a particular issue, they may find the alternatives as desirable as the 
existing procedural mechanisms to oversee the bureaucracy.  In both cases, the goal is to ensure 
that the output of the regulatory process redounds to the legislators’ benefit.  Cf. Kathleen Bawn, 
Political Control Versus Expertise:  Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 
89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995)(developing a formal model highlighting legislators’ interest in 
designing procedures forcing agencies to make technically sound decisions that balance 
competing interests as legislators intended). 
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regulations governing the use of money provided to state governments for the 
development of drug offender diversion programs (i.e., “drug courts”).  If no 
group is strong enough to sway the policy, legislations might see a political 
payoff in telling the electorate that the public will be more involved in these 
decisions.225
There is still a third scenario.  Suppose public-spirited legislators and 
bureaucrats promote the alternatives as a means of allocating political 
responsibility – even when there is some short-term (or even longer-term) 
personal political gain for them from maintaining the status quo.  This is unlikely 
but not impossible.  It is unlikely because political constraints give legislators a 
reason to support the existing arrangement instead of some more elaborate 
approach to participatory democracy in the administrative state.226  But change 
under this scenario is possible because those political constraints do not always 
overwhelm (at least in principle) countervailing impulses to pursue the 
alternatives.  I have argued above that some of those impulses could arise from 
the possibility that the alternatives are politically popular.  What is also possible 
is that policymakers would just be curious to know what the alternatives can 
reveal.  “What would a group of unaffiliated outside expert think of this?” might 
wonder a legislator asking an agency to use the corrective approach.  An agency 
official might wonder if deliberating citizens share her intuition about the need 
for an adequate margin of safety in drinking water regulations governing the 
permissible concentration of arsenic.
None of the above scenarios guarantee success in reforming public 
engagement in the administrative state.  In the meantime, some things 
resembling the corrective approach are already in use, such as negotiated 
rulemaking, blue-ribbon commissions, and the selection of political appointees 
from constituencies that are impacted by an agency’s regulations.  On occasion 
politicians can use these tactics to supplement the political mechanisms of the 
APA.  What is unsatisfying about these approaches is that, unlike the corrective 
approach I have described, there is no explicit discussion of what interests are 
likely to have a big stake in the regulation but lack the sophistication, interest, or 
ability to overcome collective action problems.  Which means, by and large, that 
these approaches fail to address the endogeneity of sophistication and interest.
225 Cf. Hugo Hopenhayn and Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight 
of Regulatory Agencies, 12 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 196, 109 (1996)(using a formal model to 
demonstrate the implication that interest-group “information providers may have incentives to 
deceive the political recipient of their signals in order to manipulate her decisions”).  Indeed, 
politicians may seldom be in a position to ascertain whether interest groups are providing 
accurate information about agencies.  Sometimes politicians will be able to learn what they need 
just by knowing that certain interest groups are opposed to a regulatory policy, because the 
interest group opposition makes enough of a difference to an electorate outcome.  But where 
interest groups are not powerful enough to offset the electoral benefits of a particular policy, then 
politicians may prefer to have some independent mechanism to inform them about what the 
larger public thinks of specific regulatory policies. 
226 See infra Part V.a.
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Some people might think that the alternatives I have suggested will be 
costly to society, at least in the beginning.  To pursue the alternatives, 
government would need to find and train moderators and lawyers, experiment 
with the format for the deliberation groups, and defend the approach from the 
slings of opposing interest groups who either reject the premise or wonder about 
the political impact of the alternative approaches on their agendas.  Even if 
sometimes the alternative approaches were close to being politically viable, they 
would create legal friction.  This is because the administrative pluralism model is 
so closely identified with the larger legal foundations of the administrative state.  
Delegation problems seem easier when everyone insisted that agencies were just 
scientists necessary to figure out the problem.  I have tried to show that 
connection between delegation and expertise to be more apparent than real, but 
the legacy of that insistence on linking expertise and the administrative state is 
the entrenchment of the administrative pluralism model.  Lawyers, judges, 
regulators, and executive branch officials who try to undermine this model create 
friction, because the alternative approaches are premised on very different 
assumptions.  Those assumptions challenge the dominance of expertise and the 
adequacy of our existing reservoir of regulatory democracy.  Which means the 
political viability of the alternative approaches depends on changing ideas as 
well as interest group politics.
CONCLUSION
Some are in darkness
And others are in light
We see those in [the] light
Those in darkness, we do not see.227
--Bertolt Brecht
Threepenny Opera
Since the modern administrative state was born, it has been characterized 
by a widely accepted approach to the question of how to involve the public in 
shaping regulatory policy.  That approach begins by limning the basic process of 
regulation -- from interpreting the statute to analyzing the plots of air-quality 
graphs -- as one that primarily involves the application of technical and scientific 
expertise.  This exercise of authority is then rendered democratically accountable 
through the machinery of representative politics and through mild “notice-and-
comment” public participation from people interested in the regulation.  And the 
entire process is policed against arbitrariness and lawlessness by courts. While 
227 BERTOLT BRECHT, THREEPENY OPERA (Stefan S. Brecht trans. 1979)(quoted in Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady, supra note ___, at xxi).
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the existing approach has been the subject of some attacks over its history, most 
judges, policymakers, and commentators have considered it unrealistic to expect 
any major change in it.  Laypeople seem to lack the time and intellectual ability 
to think about effluent standards, alternative energy sources, or financial 
information disclosure requirements. Regulation by referendum seems 
ludicrous, even in times of crisis where traditional interest group advocates are 
overwhelmed by the rapid pace of legal changes.  Yet it also seems unrealistic to 
force legislators to make all the major regulatory decisions themselves.  So 
legislators continue making broad delegations of legal authority.  These 
delegations, and the administrative state as a whole, seem most legitimate to 
people who believe in what I have called administrative pluralism: a descriptive 
theory emphasizing that organized interests have the power to influence 
regulatory policy, and a normative theory that such influence results in 
reasonably coherent, legitimate, and desirable regulatory policy.
The problem is the assumptions of administrative pluralism do not fit 
reality very well.  The public’s ability to understand regulatory policy is not 
fixed.  Neither is the public’s degree of interest in a regulatory matter that, on the 
surface, seems little more than an opportunity for experts to engage in hair-
splitting discussions.  As Section 314 and other matters demonstrate, many 
regulatory issues are not scientific issues, or even matters primarily involving 
technical assessments of probability and risk.  Technical expertise can shed light 
on the problem, but cannot really solve the problem of striking a balance
between competing values.  Even beyond the national security context, interest 
groups directly affected by regulations vigorously contest expert judgments and 
compete to shape policy.228  Interest groups and the public can and do participate 
in the rulemaking process.  But interest group leaders may not have the same 
view of the good that their members do, or the incentives to pursue it.  And in 
times of crisis, interest groups lacking exceptional funding and organization can 
be overwhelmed by the pace of legal change.  Even in ordinary times, members 
of the public (whether representing interest groups or just themselves) may try to 
participate in the notice and comment portion of the regulatory process, but that 
participation is skewed in its sophistication, and so is the agency response to it.  
All of this should lead one to question the existing approach to involving the 
public in regulatory policy, and to consider feasible alternatives like the 
corrective and majoritarian deliberation approaches I have proposed.  Not only 
do those alternatives provide regulators with valuable information that can 
improve the substance of regulation, but they also force a legitimacy-enhancing 
choice among different kinds of “democracy,” some of which may be better 
suited for certain regulatory issues.
Advocates for the administrative state have always implied that 
regulatory policy should be informed by some kind of public engagement.  This 
insight embodies the view that no one in the administrative state can possibly 
228 See supra Part IV.c.
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have all the answers: not the legislators who passed the law but left the details 
to someone else, not the voters in whose name the law was passed, not the 
regulators who write the proposed rule or the experts they consult, and not the 
interest groups whose fortunes and futures may turn on the regulation.  What 
gets done in the administrative state therefore depends a lot on whose questions 
are taken seriously.  The experience with Section 314 shows that the questions 
getting answered by the machinery of the administrative state are not the only 
ones that matter.  
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APPENDIX:  METHODS AND DATA
A.  Methods and Source of Data
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was the Treasury Department 
bureau entrusted to write the regulations implementing Section 314.  FinCEN provided me 
with all the comments submitted by individual, business, and organizational members of the 
public.229  FinCEN received and archived the comments in accordance with the requirements 
of the APA.230  A number of electronic mail comments sent to FinCEN regarding Section 
314 included no text, so these were excluded.231 Duplicate comments originating from the 
same source were counted as a single comment from that source.  The resulting number of 
comments (172) was coded in accordance with the following criteria.232
1. Commenter type:  Comments were divided into four major categories: business, 
organization representing business, other official not-for-profit organization, 
unofficial organization, and individual.  If the organization was a business or an 
organization representing business, then it was further classified into four 
categories: bank, non-bank financial institution (as traditionally defined to include 
the provision of financial services to customers), or other business. 
2. Comment sophistication: Comment sophistication was coded in two ways.  First, 
as to substance: (a) Did the commenter distinguish the regulation from the statute?233
(b) Did the commenter indicate an understanding of the statutory requirement?234 (c) 
Did the commenter ask for specific changes in the regulation provided in the notice 
of proposed rulemaking?235 (d) Did the commenter provide at least one example or 
229 See Section 314 Comments, supra note ____.
230
 APA § 553, supra note_____.
231
 Several of these comments included computer viruses.  See Section 314 Comments, supra note 
___.
232
 Coding was performed by two coders.  Intercoder reliability was assessed by randomly 
selected about 20% (34) of the comments and recoding them without examining the first coder’s 
work.  Intercoder reliability was approximately .9.
233
 This category is meant to distinguish between comments that primarily address the scope of 
the underlying statute from comments that recognize in some way that the agency cannot legally 
abrogate its responsibility under the statute and must therefore issue regulations of some kind.
234
 Whether or not the commenter distinguishes the regulation from the statute in a comment, 
there is the question of whether the commenter understands the scope of the statutory 
requirement.  For example, a commenter might simply use the comment to complain about a 
statutory requirement that allows further flexibility for the sharing of financial information 
among banks and with government in the absence of much individualized suspicion.
235
 The notice-and-comment rulemaking process seems to have as a major premise that people 
can provide feedback that could result in changes in a given regulation.  It seems logical to think 
that the chances of achieving such an impact are heightened when the commenter provides a 
specific recommendation for a change in (or for maintaining a particular aspect of) the proposed 
rule.  In any case, the capacity to ask for such a specific change plausibly reflects a commenter’s 
degree of sophistication about the rule and the underlying statute.
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separate argument for why the commenter’s concern should be addressed?236
These categories were meant to shed light on the extent of the commenter’s 
information about, and understanding of, the problem faced by the agency.  
Comment length was the second measure.  Comments of any length were coded as 
being at least one page long.  Any fraction of a page over a full page counted as an 
additional page.  A comment’s overall sophistication was defined by the product of 
its length and the number of applicable qualitative sophistication categories. 
3. Comment concerns:  Although comments varied substantially in their 
sophistication, all of the comments coded identified at least one (and often more 
than one) concern.  The comments were coded according to the following 
categories:  (a) privacy; (b) suggestions that allegedly involved merely “technical” 
changes; (c) administrative burdens on entities subject to the rule; (d) scope of, and 
eligibility for, the safe harbor included in the statute; The categories were derived 
from a qualitative analysis of the comments, with the objective of providing a 
category for virtually all of the concerns raised by any comment.
4. Comment impact:  Finally, comments were coded in accordance with whether they 
raised issues that the regulatory agency actually addressed in the changes it made to 
its proposed regulations.  I use the term “comment impact” to describe this quality: 
this implies that the comment was among one that collectively appeared to have an 
effect on the agency rule.  It does not imply information about whether an individual 
comment had an effect on the regulations.  I coded for impact by asking whether a 
comment  mentioned one or more of the recommendations that the agency actually
implemented.  These included the following recommendations: (a) making it easier 
to glean the obligations of covered financial institutions from the regulation; (b) 
reducing the administrative burden on covered financial institutions by restricting 
the scope of the time periods that they would have to search in order to comply with 
a request; (c) expanding or clarifying the scope of “financial institutions” that would 
be eligible to share information with each other subject to the statutory safe harbor 
from liability; and (d) streamlining the “certification” process for financial 
institutions who choose to take part in sharing information with each other under the 
regulation. 
B.  Excerpts From Selected Comments
Commenter Type Concern Raised Excerpt of Comment
Individual (# 9) Privacy “I am opposed to any additional 
expansion of power on the part of 
236
 This is meant to assess whether the commenter provided some measure of justification for the 
concerns raised, rather than simply stating the concern without indicating why such a concern 
was important.  No distinction was made between self-regarding arguments (i.e., this is a 
problem because it affects my business in a particular way) and public-regarding arguments (i.e., 
this is a problem because it will make Americans feel like they are constantly under surveillance, 
which will chill free expression).
RETHINKING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
82
the federal government.  The 
issues are ill defined and allow 
the U.S. Treasury the opportunity 
for further misconduct…. I am 
willing to live with the threat of 
terror rather than the creeping 
exetension [sic] of a malignant 
and paternalistic state.”
Individual (#126) Privacy “As you have requested 
comments, your gonna get ‘em.  I 
am greatly opposed to section 
314 of the USA Patriot Act.  
After reading it, I am left with 
one hugh and necessary question.  
How will any of these ‘rules’ or 
provisions have any effect in 
stopping terrorism?…. We 
already have statutes in effect 
dealing with money laundring 
[sic].  This is sufficient.  Section 
314 must not be implemented 
[sic].  The time has come for real 
police work that deters… not 
reports it after the fact.”
Individual (# 121) Privacy “This moronic P.O.D.S. (piece of 
dog s_ _t) legislation should 
never have left the table of 
whatever bumbling fool pit it in 
print… The Supreme Court has 
many times ruled that any 
legislation passed by congress 
that is repugnant to the 
Constitution, and/or 
indecipherable to the common 
man is NULL and VOID!… Are 
the bureaucrats and politicians 
going to give up their liberty and 
freedom with ease when 
someone comes knocking on 
their door to arrest them…?  
What about monitoring their 
money transactions…?  What 
about keeping a perpetual eye on 
them 24/7/365?  Are we all 
adolescents or convicts needing 
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the eye of ‘BIG BROTHER’.  
Individual (#82) Privacy “This Act offends the heck out of 
me.  The government has no 
legitimate right to involve itself 
in the financial transactions of 
others absent some true indicia of 
criminal activity other than it 
looks suspicious; that is, a 
particularly large deposit, it 
involves people the government 
already has its eyes on, and the 
like.  This should not have been 
passed in the first place; it having 
been passed, it should be read as 
narrowly as possible.”
Individual (#57) Privacy “I am opposed to this portion of 
the Patriot Act of 2001.  As a 
matter of fact, the entire act is a 
travesty.  The events of 
September 11th occurred because 
the FBI, CIA, and INS did not do 
their jobs.  That event could have 
been prevented under the laws in 
effect before September 11th but 
for poor performance on the part 
of those agencies.  I consider the
banking provisions of this act to 
be an invasion of personal 
privacy, just right for another J. 
Edgar Hoover to spy on innocent 
people.”
Business (# 143) Scope of Safe Harbor “The proposed rule contains 
various problems for the bank 
and its affiliated companies.  
Many of our affiliated companies 
meet the definition of a financial 
institution as that term is defined 
for purposes of 314(a).   A much 
smaller group meets the 
definition of a financial 
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institution for purposes of 314(b).  
We believe the notice of 
proposed rulemaking is 
unworkable for our 
organization.”
Business Representative 
(#151)
Scope of Safe Harbor “Inclusion of life insurers would 
not only allow the information 
sharing necessary for good faith 
compliance with the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public 
Law 107-56)…but also would 
allow insurers the protections 
necessary to execute such 
information sharing activities.  
As entities subject to privacy 
regulations on information 
sharing under such laws as, for 
example, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (Public Law 106-102), 
life insurers would need the safe 
harbor protections embodied in 
the Proposed Rule in sec. 
113.110(d).”
Business Representative (# 
161)
Administrability “The proposed rule requires 
firms to respond to requests for 
information from FinCEN, but 
does not specify how much time 
a firm has to conduct the search.  
The rule states, ‘[u]pon receiving 
a request from FinCEN, a 
financial institution shall search 
its records to determine whether 
it maintains or has maintained an 
account for, or has engaged in 
any transaction with’ the subject 
of FinCEN’s request.  66 Fed. 
Reg. At 9,884.  The rule also 
states that if a financial 
institution identifies an account 
or transaction, the report to 
FinCEN must be made ‘as soon 
as possible.’  The rule should 
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make clear that financial 
institutions will be provided a 
reasonable amount of time to 
search their records and to 
respond.  The burden and 
disruption to financial institutions 
would be great if responses were 
required within an unreasonably 
short time frame.”
